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Botnets are networks formed with a number of machines infected by malware called
bots. Detection of these malicious networks is a major concern as they pose a serious
threat to network security. Most of the research on botnet detection is based on particular
botnet characteristics which fail to detect other types of botnet. There exist several generic
botnet detection methods that can detect varieties of botnets. But, these generic detection
methods perform very poorly in real-life dataset as the methods are not developed based
on a real-life botnet dataset. A crucial reason for those detection methods not being developed based on a real-life dataset is that there is a scarcity of large-scale real-life botnet
dataset. Due to security and privacy concerns, organizations do not publish their real-life
botnet dataset. Therefore, there is a dire need for a simulation methodology that generates
a large-scale botnet dataset similar to the original real-life dataset while preserving the security and privacy of the network. In this dissertation, we develop a generic bot detection
methodology that can detect a variety of bots and evaluate the methodology in a real-life,

large, highly class-imbalanced dataset. Numerical results show that our methodology can
detect bots more accurately than the existing methods. Realizing the need for real-life
large-scale botnet dataset, we develop a simulation methodology to simulate a large-scale
botnet dataset from a real-life botnet dataset. Our simulation methodology is based on
Markov chain and role–mining process that can simulate the degree distributions along
with triangles (community structures). To scale-up the original graph to large-scale graph,
we also propose a scaling-up algorithm, Enterprise connection algorithm. We evaluate our
simulated graph by comparing with the original graph as well as with the graph generated
by Preferential attachment algorithm. Comparisons are done in the following three major
categories: comparison of botnet subgraphs, comparison of overall graphs and comparison
of scaled-up graphs. Result demonstrates that our methodology outperform Preferential
attachment algorithm in simulating the triangle distributions and the botnet structure.

Key words: Bot detection, botnet dataset, feature extraction, classification, graph simulation, role mining, markov chain process, large scale simulation, distributed system, highly
imbalanced dataset, real-life dataset, network traffic, netflow dataset
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In today’s world, devices, and individuals are getting more and more connected through
the internet networks that makes communications more efficient. However, this phenomenon is also making computer networks vulnerable to security breaches from attackers.
Cyber attackers can launch malicious activities in a computer network in numerous ways
including sending spam emails, breaching confidential data, and distributed denial of service (DDoS). These malicious activities are a serious threat to network security as they
can cause large system-wide consequences. Therefore, detection and elimination of the
devices, machines, or entities that can initiate and spread malicious activities is the utmost
concern to the organizations. The devices or machines that are compromised by the attackers and take part in conducting malicious activity are commonly known as bot, and their
network is called botnet.
Botnet dataset is a network dataset that contains information about the internet and
intranet traffic with normal, malicious and background activity. A real-life botnet dataset
contains all the information related to bots and how they affect a real-life network, what
are the weaknesses of a network, why the defense system fails and how the bots succeed.
In short, a real-life botnet dataset contains answers to such questions and thus need to be
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extensively studied to understand the behavior of the botnet prior to develop an effective
detection system. Though this is one of the most extensively studied research areas in the
past few years, there exist several research gaps that warrant more study to be conducted.
We study some of those gaps in this research and develop some methodologies aiming to
fill out those gaps.
The objectives of our research are the following:
1. Develop a generic bot detection methodology and analyze the performance of the
developed methodology on a real-life, highly class-imbalanced botnet dataset
2. Develop a simulation methodology that can simulate a large-scale botnet dataset
similar to a real-life botnet dataset and evaluate the performance of the developed
simulation methodology by comparing with the original graph and other existing
simulation algorithm

1.1

Background and Motivation
Though there exists numerous bot detection methods in the literature, organizations are

facing cyber attacks even more every year. One of the many reasons for which the existing
bot detection methods are failing to successfully detect the botnets is that the methods
are not developed and evaluated on real-life botnet datasets. One major application of
the botnet dataset is to study how good bot detection system are. Finding real-life, labeled
netflow dataset to perform experiment is really difficult, because of the privacy and security
issues. Most of the research created artificial botnet dataset to evaluate their methodologies.
There exist a machine named Honeypot, dedicated only to collect malicious data [1]. Most
of the research collected malicious data using the Honeypot and then artificially combined
with normal traffic to generate a botnet dataset. Some other research created a controlled
environment, knowingly infected few machines in that environment and then observed their
2

communication with other non-infected machines in that controlled environment. But, the
process of creating a real-life botnet dataset is quite complex and hence requires to maintain
few rules [2, 3]. Unfortunately, most of the datasets are not created by maintaining that
standard and thus the detection methods developed based on them are not performing well
in a real-life scenario.
Due to the absence of a public botnet dataset with the characteristics needed, Garcia et
al. [4] created a new public dataset namely CTU-13 Netflow Dataset that complies with
the required design goals. For example, real-life data has usually very low proportion of
botnet traffic compared to normal and background traffic. Also, there exist varieties of bots
in a real-life network data as seen in CTU-13 Netflow Dataset. This dataset complies with
the following criteria of a real-life botnet dataset:
• Must have real botnet attacks that are not simulated
• Must have unknown traffic from a large network
• Must have ground-truth labels for training and evaluating the methods
• Must include different types of botnets
• Must have several bots infected at the same time to capture synchronization patterns
• Must have Netflow files to protect the privacy of the user
Another advantage provided by the CTU-13 dataset is that the format of this dataset is well
defined and easy to use in research. That’s why this dataset can be considered as the closest
alternate of real-life botnet dataset. The well-defined format also makes it convenient in
research as it does not require any preprocessing. But, it is challenging to use this dataset
in research mainly because of the following two reasons: varieties of bots and high classimbalance (bot is only 0.00583% of total node). The authors of [4] evaluated three popular
3

existing generic bot detection methods on this dataset but their performance was quite poor.
Therefore, more research is needed on generic bot detection methodology to develop and
evaluate based on real-life netflow dataset.
Another gap in the network security research is the lack of real-life botnet dataset to
evaluate bot detection methodology. Unfortunately there is no other dataset similar to
CTU-13 Netflow Dataset. Due to privacy and security concerns, many different private
and government organizations can not publish their botnet dataset publicly. Even if they
publish the data publicly, they remove lots of important information to maintain security
that causes the data to fail in maintaining some of the properties of real-life botnet dataset
mentioned by [2]. Some institutions published the data, but either it is not labeled or the
format is too complex. This scarcity of real-life botnet dataset demands for synthetic or
simulated botnet dataset similar to a real-life dataset. In addition, researchers in network
security also demands for large-scale datasets so that they can evaluate the performance of
some existing and new graph algorithms. Therefore, in this research we aim to develop a
simulation methodology that can simulate a large-scale botnet dataset from a given dataset
with similar degrees and topological structures while hiding identity of the original nodes.

1.2

Literature Review
This literature review contains a summary of the two major research areas studied in

this dissertation. We categorize the literature of bot detection methodology in two major
groups: Botnet-specific and Generalized.
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As the name suggests, the research in the botnet-specific category are focused on detecting a particular type of botnet that are not applicable to other types of botnets. Chen
and Lin [5] developed a score based botnet detection method, particularly for IRC traffic.
Rishi [6] is a signature-based IRC botnet detection system that matches known IRC bot
nickname patterns. Ramachandran et al. [7] proposed an approach useful for certain types
of SPAM botnets. All of the above botnet detection methods are based on the signature
of the specific type of bots and performed well for those types of bots. However, these
methods usually fail to detect any other types of bot.
Research on the generalized botnet detection category are designed to detect botnet of
any type. BotHunter [8] is one of the most successful bot detection methods that can detect
varieties of bots if the bot behavior follows a pre-defined infection life-cycle dialog model.
But, with the evolution of bots, the new bots may not maintain the dialog-model defined
by BotHunter. In this case, BotHunter has to modify their dialog model to capture the new
bot behavior. BotSniffer [9], scans group activity and can detect centralized botnets with
protocols such as IRC and HTTP. A generalized botnet detection method using Particle
Swarm Optimization (PSO) and K-means algorithms was presented by Li et al. [10], where
the authors used a dataset that contains a high percentage of bots (33.29%) which is unusual
in real-life. Zhao et al. [11] applied several machine learning techniques to detect botnets
of different types. But this research used a merged dataset that is collected from different
sources and contain 5.8% malicious data. Merged dataset can be biased, erroneous, and
may not represent real world scenarios.

5

Most of the research in bot detection methodology used dataset which do not reflect
real-life scenario and therefore they fail to detect bots in real-life scenario.
One of the challenges the researchers in bot detection area as well as other researchers
in network security are struggling with is the lack of proper real-life dataset. The publicly available real life botnet dataset are modified by their owner. The security concern of
those datasets demands for a simulation methodology that can simulate a dataset similar
to a given dataset (real-life botnet dataset) and will ensure the security of the private information. There exist several graph simulation algorithm in the literature, but all of them
perform poorly in simulating the topological structure. It is a well-known open problem in
graph theory. Erdos-Renyi [12] is probably the simplest and the earliest graph simulation
algorithm, but it fails to simulate one of the desired property of real-life graph known as
power-law. Barbasi-Albert [13] also known as Preferential attachment is successful in simulating power law, but it failed to simulate the topological structures. Since then Newman’s
algorithm [14], RMAT [15], Kronecker [16, 17] and lots of other simulation methodologies are trying to solve this problem. But, it seems there is no generic solution for this
problem yet. Some methods may work well for sparse graph, but show poor performance
for dense graph and some are good for dense graph whereas bad for sparse. BTER [18]
is a recent paper focused on simulating community structures. They achieved some amazing result, but it seems to be applicable mostly to dense graphs while most of the real-life
botnet dataset are sparse dataset.
This dissertation is organized as follows: In Chapter II, limitation of current bot detection literature is studied. A generic bot detection methodology is developed to detect
6

varieties of bots from a botnet dataset. The bot detection methodology is evaluated on
a real-life, highly class-imbalanced dataset. Performance of our developed bot detection
method is compared with one of the most recent paper [4] of the relevant field. A conference paper based on the content of this chapter [19] is published to the IEEE 15th International Conference on Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing.
In Chapter III, literature on existing graph simulation techniques are studied and the
necessity of simulating botnet dataset is analyzed. A simulation methodology is developed
that simulates a large-scale botnet dataset with similar degree distribution and topological structure as the original dataset. We used the same dataset, CTU-13 Netflow dataset
to evaluate our simulation methodology. The simulated botnet dataset is compared with
the original dataset and graphs simulated by Preferential attachment algorithm using histograms and few graph metrics. We compared the botnet subgraphs in the simulated graphs
and the botnet subgraph in the original graph using visualization and some of the graph
metrics. Moreover, the simulated scaled-up graph is compared with the smaller original
graph. All these comparison results from the numerical experimentation indicate success
of our simulation methodology in preserving the desired patterns of botnet subgraph as
well as the distribution of triangles, indegrees and outdegrees.
Chapter IV, summarizes our overall achievements in this dissertation, the limitations
and future research.
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CHAPTER II
BOT DETECTION FOR REAL-LIFE HIGHLY CLASS-IMBALANCED DATASET

2.1

Introduction
A botnet is a network that consists of machines connected to the internet which are

compromised by a malware [20, 21]. These machines are known as bots. One advantage of
bots over other malicious entities is that they can communicate with each other over a large
network. Bots are a serious threat to the internet security, as they are designed to perform
a wide range of malicious activities such as sending spam emails, conducting distributed
denial of service (DDoS), click-fraud (CF) scams, etc. Therefore, continuous research on
detection of bot-botnet and analyzing their behavior on large-scale graph dataset are an
important concern to many organizations prior to taking any countermeasures.
In this research, we develop a generic bot detection methodology that can detect varieties of bots from real-life botnet dataset. Performance of our bot detection method is
evaluated on a real-life highly class-imbalanced botnet dataset. We also compare our experimental results with three bot detection methods from most recent and relevant research.

2.1.1

Literature Review

There exists abundant research on the detection of bots. In this section, we discuss
relevant research on both bot and botnet detection. As botnets can be detected from bots
8

and vice versa, the terms bot and botnet are used interchangeably in the literature [3]. We
classify the existing bot detection literature into the following two types: botnet-specific
detection and generalized detection methods.
Botnet-specific: All the bot detection methods mentioned in this category are based on
the signature of particular type of bot and performed well for those types of bot. However,
these methods usually fail to detect any other types of botnets and bots.
Rishi [6] is an IRC based bot detection framework. It passively monitors network
traffic for unusual or suspicious IRC nicknames, IRC servers, and uncommon server ports.
By using n-gram analysis and a scoring system, they detects bots that use uncommon
communication channels. Rishi captures TCP packets for the occurrence of one of the
following IRC commands: NICK, JOIN, USER, QUIT, and MODE. The parameters given
with these commands are extracted and stored to be further analyzed by the program. The
analysis mostly focuses on the nicknames , all other information are stored as additional
information of the botnet.
Ramachandran et al. [7] developed an detection methodology for several types of
SPAM bots (DDoS, ClickFraud, SPAM email). It is based on the construction of a DNSbased blackhole list (DNSBL) query graph, where an edge in the graph from node A to
node B indicates that node A has issued a query to a DNSBL to determine whether node
B is listed. After constructing this graph, they develop detection heuristics based on the
expected spatial and temporal characteristics of legitimate lookups versus reconnaissancebased lookups. Their methodology is based on the insight that botmasters themselves
perform DNSBL lookups to determine whether their spamming bots are blacklisted.
9

Livadas et al. [22] used machine learning-based classification techniques to identify
the command and control traffic of IRC-based botnets. They split their tasks in two stages:
distinguishing IRC and non-IRC traffic , botnet and real-IRC traffic. They compared different features and performance of different classifiers, for example, Naive Bayes and
Bayesian Network Classifiers. They achieved good result in distinguishing IRC and nonIRC traffic but they mentioned the second task as a challenging one by using classification algorithms. There exist several other researches on IRC based bot detection methods
[23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 5].
Mirkovi´c et al. [28] proposed D-WARD, a DDoS defense system deployed at sourceend networks that autonomously detects and stops attacks originating from these networks.
Attacks are detected by the constant monitoring of two-way traffic flows between the network and the rest of the Internet and periodic comparison with normal flow models. Mismatching flows are rate-limited in proportion to their aggressiveness.
Ioannidis and Bellovin [29] implemented pushback mechanism for defending against
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. The work is based on the idea that malicious
hosts which are not obeying traditional end-to-end congestion control are causing congestion in the network. So the problem must be handled by the routers. Functionality is added
to each router to detect and preferentially drop packets that probably belong to an attack.
Upstream routers are also notified to drop such packets (hence the term Pushback) in order that the router’s resources be used to route legitimate traffic. More work on DDoS
detection can be found on [30, 31, 32].
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Generalized: These class of methods are not limited to any particular type of botnet,
rather can detect varieties of botnets. Gu et al. proposed three successful bot-detection
frameworks named: BotHunter [8], BotSniffer [9] and BotMiner [33]. BotHunter depends
on the fact that all bots performs the following common set of actions as part of their lifecycle: scanning, infection, binary download, C&C, and outbound scanning. This framework
monitors a network and capture activity related to these actions and then performs some
payload analysis and malware activity detection based on Snort rules [34]. After that,
BotHunter uses a correlation engine to generate a score for the probability that a bot has
infected the network. Similar to most of the correlation based detection methods, BotHunter works best when a bot has passed through all the stages of its lifecycle. But with the
evolution of bots, the new bots may not maintain the dialog-model defined by BotHunter.
In this case, BotHunter has to modify their dialog model to capture the new bot behavior.
The main idea of BotSniffer [9] is the same as BotHunter, but, BotSniffer scans group
activity. The authors’ approach was based on the observation that, as the activities of the
C&C servers are pre-programmed, bots within the same botnet will likely demonstrate
spatial-temporal correlation and similarity. BotSniffer consists of two components: the
monitor engine and the correlation engine. In the correlation engine, it applies several
correlation and similarity analysis algorithm to detect the bots. The BotSniffer is only
able to detect centralized botnets with protocol like, HTTP and IRC. Similar to BotSniffer,
BotMiner [33] focused on group level activities, but it used unsupervised algorithms to
detect botnet. It is also independent of the C&C protocol and botnet structure. BotMiner
applied clustering algorithm to cluster malicious traffic and normal traffic. Then it applied
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cross cluster correlation to identify hosts that share both normal communication and malicious communication. The results of this paper showed that BotMiner can detect real
world botnets (IRC, HTTP and P2P) and had a very low false detection rate. Both of these
methods are based on group level activities. Thus, if bots are not performing coordinated
commanded activities, these methods may fail to detect bots.
There also exist some research studies that propose supervised learning methods to
detect generic types of bots. Shing-Han Li et al. [10] proposed a bot detection method
based on network behavior using Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) and K-means algorithms. The authors captured a real life dataset, where botnet mainly consisted of botmaster, command and control (C&C) server, and botclient. In this dataset, the botclient
are approximately 33.29% of total IP addresses which is unusual in real life. The authors
proposed a classification approach to detect botclient from normal client. This research
extracted several IP based featured and grouped them into three categories: ActBehavior,
FailBehavior, ScanBehavior. Then PSO and K-means applied on those features to classify
botclient. However, they have not compared their results with any of the existing methods.
Zhao et al. [11] worked on botnet detection based on traffic behavior analysis and
flow intervals using machine learning algorithms. This research collected real life data
from many different sources, and merged them together, which contained 5.8% malicious
data. Merged dataset can be biased, erroneous and may not represent real world scenarios.
To detect malicious netflow, they selected twelve flow based features like, SrcIP, SrcPort,
DstIP, DstPort, Average payload packet length for a time interval and etc. After investigating several machine learning algorithms including Bayesian Network, Neural Network,
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Support Vector Machine (SVM), and Nearest Neighbor Classifier, they used decision tree
algorithm based on their experience. The authors made a comparison of their results with
BotHunter [8].
Zhang et al. [35] extracted sixteen flow based features and proposed botnet detection
method based on PSO algorithm. To ensure the effectiveness of the PSO based classification, this paper showed a comparison with J48 (e.g. the WEKA implementation of C4.5
decision tree) and Bayesian Networks (BN). The results showed that using PSO performed
better than J48 and BN.
Yu et al. [36] proposed an online botnet detection technique that can detect centralized
botnets. At first, they converted the network traffic into multi-dimensional features stream
and then used a data-adaptive clustering algorithm to group the netflow. Then, they used a
similarity based metric to classify the botnet cluster that meet the criteria on the moment
without considering their earlier behavior.
Wurzinger et al. [37] proposed an algorithm to identify individual infected bot that are
part of a botnet by monitoring a network and analyzing and correlating the commands and
responses in network traces. To be specific, the proposed approach first launch a bot in a
controlled environment and then record the commands it received from botmaster and the
responses it send. Then, based on the identified commands and responses, they developed
some detection models, where each generated models are specific to particular bot family.
To evaluate their framework, they developed eighteen models for different types of bots.
As they had different classification models for different bot types, false positive rate was
very low in their case.
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2.1.2

Research Gap

The existing literature on bot detection has some limitations. A large portion of the
developed methodologies can detect only specific types of bots [38]. The generalized
bot detection methods perform better than the botnet-specific methods. But some of the
generalized bot detection methods only work for group-level activities and fail if there is
no group activities. Other existing generalized methods do not suffer from the limitation of
group-activities and can detect individual bots but these methodologies are not evaluated
on a real-life, highly imbalanced dataset.
Most of the research on bot detection assumed that there are multiple infected machines
in a network. However, TANET, an internet network for all the academic and educational
institutions of Taiwan, suggests that there might be only one or very few infected machines
in a real network [39]. Additionally, the datasets used in most of the above-mentioned
research were collected using Honeypots, a machine dedicated to collect only malicious
data. So, these data usually do not contain normal traffic which prohibits accurate modeling of real traffic using these data [1]. Therefore, the bot detection methodologies that
performed well in a dataset that contains a high percentage of bots, may not perform well
in a real-life scenario.
Considering the need for a real-life dataset, Garcia et al. [4] captured a real-life dataset
named CTU-13 Netflow Dataset. This dataset is highly class-imbalanced and contains the
following types of netflows: botnet, normal and background netflow. The authors evaluated two botnet detection methods, CAMNEP and BClus on CTU-13 dataset. CAMNEP
consists of various anomaly detection methods. BClus is a classification-based botnet de14

tection method. Garcia et al. [4] also applied one of the most successful botnet detection
methods, BotHunter [8] on the CTU-13 dataset and compared the results with CAMNEP
and BClus. But none of these three detection methods performed well on the CTU-13
dataset. Moreover, the performance of BotHunter[8] on CTU-13 dataset was not as good
as in its original work. This is one good example where the existing generalized bot detection methods perform poorly in detecting bots from a real-life highly class-imbalanced
dataset.
Garcia et al. [4] redefined the trivial error metrics, True Positive, True Negative, False
Positive, False Negative based on time frame. In the calculation of these error metrics,
Garcia et al. [4] considered an IP address as a bot if at least one of its incoming or outgoing
arcs (in a single time frame) is classified as a malicious netflow. But if an IP address is
associated with hundreds of netflows in one time frame, it is not sufficient to consider the
IP address as bot just based on a single netflow. This assumption possesses the following
shortcoming: it relaxes the condition for an IP address to be detected as a bot and due to the
relaxation, numerous nonbots are detected as bot. For brevity, in the rest of this research,
we refer IP address as IP.
The above research gap suggests that more research is needed on bot detection. Particularly, research is needed to develop generic bot detection methods to detect bots from a
real-life, highly class-imbalanced dataset.
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2.1.3

Contributions

To fill the gaps in the existing literature, this research introduces three generic novel
features that are used to develop classification models for bot detection in a real-life, highly
imbalanced dataset. Our proposed generic bot detection method provides better accuracy
than the existing methods in the literature. The contributions of this research are the following:
1. Develop three generic novel IP-based features.
2. Calculate these three features for a publicly available, real-life, highly class-imbalanced
dataset named CTU-13 Netflow Dataset [4], and apply five classification methods on
those features.
3. Compare our methodology with Garcia et al. [4] where the results show better performance of our methodology.

Our developed methodology is able to classify bots in a large network with very low proportion of bots (0.00583%).

2.2

Problem Description and Assumptions
This research deals with the detection of varieties of bots and botnets in a large real-

life network with a very low proportion of bots using supervised learning methods. Our
goal is to develop novel generic features so that the classifiers can detect different types
of bots regardless to their underlying botnet characteristics and architecture. Also, the
methodology should be able to detect bots from a real-life class-imbalance dataset.
We implement our methods on the real-life, labeled and publicly available CTU-13
Netflow Dataset. Table 2.1 shows different types of bots and botnet characteristics exist in
the CTU-13 dataset. The two major challenges to work with this dataset are: 1) it contains
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a variety of bots and 2) the amount of bot traffic is very low (0.00583%) compared to all
the IP traffic. For details of the dataset, see [4].

Table 2.1: Varieties of bot and botnet characteristics at CTU-13 netflow dataset

2.2.1

Scenario

Botnet Characteristics

Bot

#Bots

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

IRC, SPAM, CF
IRC, SPAM, CF
IRC, PS, US
IRC, DDoS, US
SPAM, PS, HTTP
PS
HTTP
PS
IRC, SPAM, CF, PS
IRC, DDoS, US
IRC, DDoS, US
P2P
SPAM, PS, HTTP

Neris
Neris
Rbot
Rbot
Virut
Menti
Sogou
Murlo
Neris
Rbot
Rbot
NSIS.ay
Virut

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
10
10
3
3
1

Assumptions

To develop our generic bot detection methodology, we hypothesize that at the early
stage of an attack, a bot tries to infect many different nonbots, communicating with each
only a small number of times. But later in the attack stage, the bot communicates many
times with the infected hosts only.
The life-cycle of a usual botnet can be summarized into the following three stages:
conception, spreading, and attack [40, 41]. Figure 2.1 demonstrates the life-cycle of a
botnet. The attacker plans for the attack and structures the botnet in the conception stage.
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The spreading stage involves the scanning and infection of vulnerable machines. Finally,
the botnet attacks the targeted system in the attack stage.

Figure 2.1: Botnet life cycle

In this research, we focus on the spreading and attack stages of the botnet life-cycle.
Botnets derive their power by scale, both in their cumulative bandwidth and in their ability
to connect with a large number of nonbots [41, 25]. The mechanisms used by the bots to
spread vary greatly depending on the attacker’s intelligence, intention, and targeted system.
But most of them follow one major rule in common, which is to scan for vulnerabilities
[20]. So, in the spreading stage, a bot will communicate with many different hosts in search
of vulnerabilities. Once the bot successfully infects the hosts, the next stage is to attack.
Regardless of the protocol, topology and model used, the bot installed on the infected host
starts communicating with other bots via receiving and executing the commands. In the
attack stage, a bot will frequently communicate with other bots in the botnet.
Therefore, based on the life-cycle of a botnet, we assume that in the spreading stage,
a bot performs few communications with a large number of hosts. Later, in attack stage,
a bot mostly communicates with the infected hosts but in high frequency. Hence, if we
combine communications in spreading and attack stages where a bot acts as a source IP,
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the bot and infected IP pair have significantly higher communication frequency than the
bot and uninfected IP pairs. On the other hand, when a nonbot acts as a source IP, there is
no such noticeable difference in communication frequencies.

2.3

Bot Detection Methodology
This section describes the complete bot detection methodology. The architecture of

the overall process is shown in Figure 2.2. At first, we filter out the unnecessary data and
then apply the feature extractor to the rest of the data. The feature extractor calculates
the desired features from the given dataset. We use these features in developing several
classification models to classify the bots and nonbots.

Figure 2.2: Architecture of bot detection process
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The following subsections describe the procedure of unnecessary data filtration, necessary feature extraction and the classification methodology.

2.3.1

Filtering

To improve the computational efficiency of our bot detection method, we filter out the
IPs which satisfy any of the following two conditions:
1. Never acts as a source: This type of IPs can never be a bot because a bot IP must
has to act as a source at least once in its life-cycle. In a real-life dataset the number
of nonbot IPs is very high compared to the bot IPs. To reduce the imbalance in the
data, we can filter out some known nonbots.
2. Perform only single communication with one other IP: This type of IPs also can never
be a bot IP as they violate our assumptions mentioned in Section 2.2.1. However,
the percentage of these inactive nonbot IPs can be very high in the real-life dataset.
Removal of these inactive IPs can make the resulting dataset much smaller in size,
which reduces the computational effort required in the feature calculation process
greatly.

2.3.2

Feature Extraction

Based on our assumptions of bot behavior (section 2.2), we develop the following three
features that can distinguish the bots from the nonbots:
1. Falling rate of communication frequency (FRCF)
2. Median communication frequency (MCF)
3. Source bytes per packet for highest communication frequency (SBHC)

All of these features are computed for each source-destination pair of IPs after filtering. In
the following subsections, we explain the calculation of each feature in detail and explain
the features with example data drawn from CTU-13 netflow dataset.
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2.3.2.1

Falling Rate of Communication Frequency (FRCF)

For each unique source IP, we calculate the total number of times (frequency) it communicates with each unique destination IP and create a list of the communication frequencies. Then we sort the communication frequencies in descending order and assign a Rank
to each frequency. Table 2.2 shows the sorted communication frequencies of a bot source
IP A with the destination IPs, and Table 2.3 shows the sorted communication frequencies
of a nonbot source IP M with the destination IPs in the CTU-13 dataset. It is seen from
Table 2.2 that there is a sharp change between the first two communication frequencies.
So, the bot source IP is communicating more with the infected destination IP compared to
the other uninfected destination IPs. On the other hand, it is evident from Table 2.3 that
the nonbot source IP does not show a sharp decrease in communication frequency with the
destination IPs as the bot source IP.

Table 2.2: Communication frequency of bot IP A, with other unique IPs
Rank

Source

Destination

Frequency

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

A
A
A
A
A
A
A

D
B
E
C
K
P
O

9548
18
3
3
1
1
1
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Table 2.3: Communication frequency of bot IP A, with other unique IPs
Rank

Source

Destination

Frequency

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

M
M
M
M
M
M
M

D
B
E
C
K
P
O

4304
568
259
77
73
67
66

The communication frequencies of three bot IPs and three nonbot IPs are demonstrated
in Figure 2.3. As the range of communication frequency is very large, we use the logarithm
of the communication frequency.

Figure 2.3: Communication frequencies of three bot IPs and three nonbot IPs

From Figure 2.3, it is seen that the communication frequencies of a bot source IP with
the destination IPs fall at a much higher rate as compared to the communication frequencies
of a nonbot source IP. So, the communication frequency falling rate is one of the distin22

guishing features of bot IP. To calculate the falling rate of communication frequency, we
need to find the slope of the frequency curve in an appropriate position. But it is difficult
to find the appropriate position in the curve. Because different source IPs (both bot and
nonbot) communicate with different number of destination IPs, e.g., some source IP communicate with only 10 destination IPs, whereas some source IP communicate with 25,000
destination IPs. So, for different source IPs, the spread of communication frequency curves
varies along Rank axis. After extensive experimentation, we found that the slope between
the first three points of the frequency curve is effective in distinguishing between bot and
nonbot IPs, as the slope of the curve is usually steepest in that position. We calculate the
falling rate of communication frequency using equation (2.1).
F RCF =

2.3.2.2

HighestF requency−3rd HighestF requency
2

(2.1)

Median Communication Frequency (MCF)

In addition to the frequency falling rate, the median value of the communication frequency is another important feature in distinguishing between bot and nonbot behaviour.
Though a bot always tries to infect as many nonbots as possible, it can infect only a few
nonbots. So, most of the nonbots which are unaffected by the bot have approximately single communication with the bot. So, the communication frequency list of the bot contains
mostly a frequency value of 1. Thus, for a bot, the median value of the communication frequencies is either one or very close to one. However, when a nonbot source IP is communicating with other destination IPs, the value of communication frequencies varies greatly as
well as the 1) median value of communication frequencies. This phenomenon can be ex23

plained using Figure 2.3, where more than 50% (from Rank 5 to Rank 11) communication
frequencies of the bots have a value of 1. On the other hand, most of the communication
frequencies of the nonbot source IP are very different than 1. For example, in Table 2.2,
for bot IP A, the median frequency is 3, whereas in Table 2.3, for nonbot IP M, it is 77.

2.3.2.3

Source Bytes per Packet for Highest Communication Frequency (SBHC)

A bot IP mostly sends commands while communicating with an infected IP. Usually,
these commands are similar and fixed in size. As a result, source bytes per packet is almost
the same for every bot IP and infected IP pair. So, source bytes per packet of a bot IP and
an infected IP pair is also an important feature for bot detection. To calculate this feature
for each source IP, the destination IP is selected among the existing destinations having the
highest communication frequency with the source IP. Because this destination IP has the
highest possibility of being infected if the source IP is a bot. For example, we see from
Table 2.2 that the highest communication frequency of bot IP A is with destination IP D.
Thus the source bytes per packet for bot IP A is calculated using the total number of source
bytes and the total number of packets involved in the communications between A and D.

2.3.3

Classification Models

To develop classification models using these three features, the following supervised
learning algorithms are used: Quadratic discriminant analysis (QDA), Gaussian Naı̈ve
Bayes (GNB), Support Vector Machine (SVM), K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) and Random
Forest (RF). We use SVM with the following three kernel functions: linear, polynomial,
and radial basis function (RBF). Experiments show that RBF performs better among the
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three kernels. As most of the real world datasets are class-imbalanced and contain noise,
we chose from some of the existing classifiers those are less affected by data imbalance
and tolerant to noisy data.

2.4

Results and Discussion
We calculate the necessary features and perform computational experiments to detect

bots using the classification algorithms. All the experiments are run on a supercomputer
named Shadow, at Mississippi State University, which consists of 4800 Intel Ivy Bridge
processor cores and 28,800 Intel Xeon Phi cores. Each compute node has a maximum of
512 GB of RAM for a system total of 70 TB of RAM. Each node consists of 20 cores.
In our experimentation, parallel processing is used for filtering, feature extraction, and
comparing the results with Garcia et al. [4]. Depending on the complexity of the methods
and amount of data to process, 20, 60, 80 or 100 processors are used. As the filtering step
removes most of the unnecessary data, supervised learning and bot classification steps are
done easily using a single processor. We implement our methodology using Python 2.7
along with the following packages: MPI4Py, Numpy, Scipy, Pandas, Matplotlib, Scikitlearn.
The following subsections present the experimental data preparation, bot classification
results and comparison of the results of our methodology with Garcia et al. [4].

2.4.1

Data Preparation

To develop the classifiers, we split our dataset into training and testing datasets. As
the numbers of bots are very few (35 bots, among 600k nonbots) in the CTU-13 dataset,
25

random selection is not appropriate. That is, if random selection is used, there is a high
possibility that the number of bots in the training dataset will be very few, possibly even
zero, which will lead to a wrong classifier. So, to develop an efficient classifier, we ensure
that we have approximately 80% of the bots in our training dataset and 20% in the testing
dataset. Similar to Garcia et al. [4], we divide the 13 scenarios into training and testing
dataset so that none of the bots used in the training and cross-validation dataset is used
in the testing dataset. This ensures the generalization of our bot detection method. The
separation of the dataset is shown in Table 2.4.

Table 2.4: Training and testing dataset

2.4.2

Dataset

Dataset

#Bots

Training and cross-validation
Testing

3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13
1, 2, 6, 8, 9

21
14

Bot Classification Results

We use five classification algorithms as mentioned earlier. As the proportion of bots
are much fewer compared to the nonbots (0.00583%), to balance this disproportion, we
set weightage ratio of nonbot to bot class to 1:125 for SVM, KNN, and RF classifiers.
The rationale of this weightage ratio parameter is to maintain the unbiased behavior of the
classifiers in a class-imbalanced data. QDA and GNB do not require any parameters.
Classification results from each of the classifiers and each test scenario are described
in this section. The performance metrics used in this subsection are given below:
• True positive rate: T P R =

TP
T P +F N
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• True negative rate: T N R =

TN
T N +F P

• False positive rate: F P R =

FP
T N +F P

• False negative rate: F N R =
• P recision =
• Accuracy =

FN
F N +T P

TP
T P +F P
T P +T N
T P +T N +F P +F N

• ErrorRate =

F P +F N
T P +T N +F P +F N

• F M easure1 =

2∗P recision∗T P R
P recision+T P R

Here, T P = True positive, F N = False negative, T N = True negative, F P = False positive.
Using the above-mentioned metrics, we analyze the classification results for the following five test cases: scenario 1, scenario 2, scenario 6, scenario 8, and scenario 9.

2.4.2.1

Classification Results for Scenario 1

Our classification outcomes are not probability values of being bot or nonbot. They
provide binary results of either a bot or a nonbot. As scenario 1 contains only 1 Neris bot
IP among 661,389 IPs and only 1.45% of netflows are botnets, it is very difficult to classify
the bot IP in this scenario. But Table 2.5 shows that the following three classifiers: QDA,
GNB and SVM successfully detect the bot IP with very low FPR (< 0.002).

Table 2.5: Classification results of scenario 1
Name

TP

QDA
GNB
SVM
KNN
RF

1
1
1
0
0

TN

FP

236371 265
236162 474
236567 69
236635 1
236634
2

FN

TPR

TNR

FPR

FNR

0
0
0
1
1

1
1
1
0
0

0.999
0.998
0.999
0.999
0.999

0.001
0.002
0.0002
0
0

0
0
0
1
1
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2.4.2.2

Classification Results for Scenario 2

In scenario 2, there is only 1 Neris bot IP and among 480,500 IPs and 1.16% netflows
are botnet. The classification results for this scenario are shown in Table 2.6. It is evident
from Table 2.6 that the QDA, GNB, and SVM classifiers detect the bot IP successfully with
very low FPR (<0.003).

Table 2.6: Classification results of scenario 2

2.4.2.3

Name

TP

QDA
GNB
SVM
KNN
RF

1
1
1
0
0

TN

FP

161859 241
161624 476
162041 59
162100 0
162097
3

FN

TPR

0
0
0
1
1

1
1
1
0
0

TNR

FPR

0.998 0.0015
0.997 0.003
0.999 0.0004
1
0
0.999
0

FNR
0
0
0
1
1

Classification Results for Scenario 6

There is only 1 Menti bot IP among 114,779 IPs and 0.83% of the netflows are botnet
in scenario 6. The classification results for this scenario are shown in Table 2.7, which
shows that QDA and GNB classifiers can successfully detect the bot with a very low FPR
(<0.016). However, though the other classifiers cannot detect the bot, their FPR is very
low.
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Table 2.7: Classification results of scenario 6

2.4.2.4

Name

TP

QDA
GNB
SVM
KNN
RF

1
1
0
0
0

TN

FP

19307 156
19151 312
19420 43
19463
0
19463
0

FN

TPR

0
0
1
1
1

1
1
0
0
0

TNR

FPR

0.992 0.008
0.984 0.016
0.998 0.0022
1
0
1
0

FNR
0
0
1
1
1

Classification Results for Scenario 8

In scenario 8, there is only 1 Murlo bot IP among 431,638 IPs and 1.42% of netflows
are botnet. The classification results for this scenario are shown in Table 2.8, which shows
that QDA and GNB classifiers can successfully detect the bot with very low FPR (<0.004).
Although the other classifiers cannot detect the bot, their FPR is very low (<0.0005).

Table 2.8: Classification results of scenario 8

2.4.2.5

Name

TP

QDA
GNB
SVM
KNN
RF

1
1
0
0
0

TN

FP

154237 288
153906 619
154449 76
154525 0
154523
2

FN

TPR

0
0
1
1
1

1
1
0
0
0

TNR

FPR

0.998 0.0019
0.996 0.004
0.999 0.0005
1
0
0.999
0

FNR
0
0
1
1
1

Classification Results for Scenario 9

There are 10 Neris bot IPs among 407,065 IPs in scenario 9 and 8.86% of the netflows
are botnet. The classification results for this scenario are shown in Table 2.9. Compared
to all other test scenarios, it is easier to detect some of the bots among the 10 bots in this
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scenario. But detecting all the 10 bots is challenging. It is evident from Table 2.9 that the
following classifiers: QDA, GNB, and SVM detect all 10 of bot IPs successfully with very
low FPR (<0.0004).

Table 2.9: Classification results of scenario 9

2.4.2.6

Name

TP

QDA
GNB
SVM
KNN
RF

10
10
10
0
0

TN

FP

FN

TPR

123969 234
123629 574
124152 51
124203
0
124200
3

0
0
0
10
10

1
1
1
0
0

TNR

FPR

0.998 0.0019
0.995 0.0046
0.999 0.00042
1
0
0.999
0

FNR
0
0
0
1
1

Performance Analysis of the Classifiers

From the above bot detection results, it is seen that QDA and GNB classifiers perform
best in all the test scenarios. SVM classifier performs well in three test scenarios. KNN
and RF classifiers fail to classify the bots in all the test scenarios. As the CTU-13 dataset is
highly class-imbalanced, the classifiers unaffected by class imbalance perform better than
the classifiers affected by class imbalance [42].
Naı̈ve Bayes (NB) is one of the most efficient and effective supervised learning algorithms. The dependence distribution plays a crucial role in the surprising success of NB.
Therefore, class-imbalance may have a minor effect if the dependencies are distributed
evenly in classes, or if the dependencies canceled each other out [43]. The QDA classifier
is based on the Naı̈ve Bayes and, similar to GNB, performed well in our bot classification.
Similar results for QDA classifier with class-imbalanced data is available in the literature
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[44, 45]. SVM performed well in three among the five test scenarios. Though it is a
known concept that SVM is less affected by class-imbalance, in practice, for highly classimbalanced dataset SVM also fails to act as an unbiased classifier [42, 46].
RF and KNN performed very poorly in bot classification in our experiments. RF is
based on the decision tree algorithm which does not perform well on imbalanced data
[42]. In case of using KNN with class-imbalanced data, there is a higher probability for
the minority classes to be incorrectly classified. Because, for a test sample, the KNN has
higher probabilities of choosing samples from the majority class [42]. Due to these reasons
both RF and KNN classifiers have higher TN and lower FP than QDA, GNB, and SVM.

2.4.3

Comparison with Previous Research

We compare the results of bot detection from our methodology with the results from
Garcia et al. [4]. To compare multiple detection methods using the same performance metrics, Garcia et al. [4] provided a BotnetDetectorComparer that takes labeled netflow data
as input and computes the following performance metrics: cTPR, cTNR, cFPR, cFNR,
Precision, Accuracy, ErrorRate, and FMeasure1 (FM1) as output. These customized performance metrics are proposed in [4]. To use the BotnetDetectorComparer, we label all
the netflows of each of our test scenarios as botnet or nonbot. We apply a trivial approach
that considers all the outgoing netflows of each detected bot IP as botnet for each test scenario. In our experimentation, QDA and GNB perform best among all the classifiers. So,
we compare QDA and GNB with the three best methods from [4] which are: CAMNEP
(CA1), BClus, and BotHunter (BH). We provide the labeled netflows from our classifiers
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for each test scenario to the BotnetDetectorComparer and obtain the customized performance metrices. The comparison of our QDA and GNB classifiers with the BClus, CA1,
and BH of [4] based on the customized performance metrics are demonstrated in Figures
2.4, 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7.
We see from Figure 2.4 that the precision of our QDA and GNB classifier is relatively
higher than the precision of BClus, CA1, and BH for all the test scenarios except scenario
6.

Figure 2.4: Comparison of precision

Figure 2.5 shows the accuracy of the classifiers for all the five test scenarios. It is seen
that the bot detection accuracy of our QDA and GNB is much higher than the accuracy of
Bclus, CA1, and BH of Garcia et al. [4] for all the test scenarios.
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Figure 2.5: Comparison of accuracy

It is evident from Figure 2.6 that the error rate of the BClus, CA1, and BH of [4] is
significantly higher than the QDA and GNB classifier of our work. The FM1 of the QDA
and GNB is also much higher than the FM1 of BClus, CA1, and BH in Figure 2.7.

Figure 2.6: Comparison of error rate
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Figure 2.7: Comparison of fmeasure1

In the comparison of bot detection methods, FM1 is a better evaluation metric than
the precision, accuracy, and error rate. For CTU-13 dataset, accuracy and error rate can be
good even if a bot detection method can successfully detect only the nonbots as the percentage of nonbot is more than 99%. Again, both accuracy and error rate measure the overall
performance of the detection method and failure to detect few bots has a minor effect on
them. But correctly detecting the bot IPs are more important than correctly detecting the
nonbot IPs in network security. So, accuracy and error rate are not good indicators of performance for the bot detection methods. Moreover, precision alone is also not sufficient
to evaluate the performance of a classification method. Because the definition of precision
only considers the FP and TP. But in bot detection, FN is more important than FP, because
the impact of misclassifying a bot is higher than misclassifying a nonbot. Therefore, to
evaluate a bot detection method, considering TPR (recall) is very important along with
precision. The FM1 considers both TPR and precision. Thus, FM1 provides a complete
evaluation of the performance of a bot detection method in this situation. The higher is the
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value of FM1, the better the bot detection method. In our experiment, the QDA and GNB
significantly outperform the BClus, CA1 and BH of Garcia et al. [4] based on FM1.

2.5

Conclusions and Future Work
In this research, we develop a novel methodology based on supervised learning that can

detect bots from a real-life, large, and highly imbalanced network dataset. This methodology is not specific to any particular type of botnet characteristics, rather it can detect any
type of bots. We propose three novel generic IP-based features to develop classification
models for bot detection. We implement our methodology on a real-life, large dataset and
evaluate the performance based on four performance metrics. Results show that the proposed bot detection methodology classifies different types of bots with 99.66% accuracy,
which is higher than results from previous work. We also compare our methodology with
the methods of Garcia et al. [4] that shows the better performance of our method in bot
detection for real-life highly class-imbalanced dataset.
Our bot detection methodology is not a real-time detection system, rather it can identify
new type of bots after the attack stage. Detection of these new bots enables forensic analysis to extract characterizing features of those bots. These features can be used to develop
more sophisticated real-time bot detection method that can detect these types of bots before
the attack stage. Therefore, our bot detection methodology can serve as a complementary
system to a real-time bot detection method.
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CHAPTER III
SIMULATION OF LARGE-SCALE BOTNET DATASET

3.1

Introduction
Botnet dataset is a network dataset that contains information about the internet and

intranet traffic with normal, malicious and background activity. The main purpose of a
botnet dataset is to provide an overall idea of the real effects of cyber attacks over the
network so that researchers in network security and other relevant fields can study the
dataset to find regular patterns, abnormal behaviors, or test new methodologies. For this
reason, it is necessary for the dataset to behave as realistically as possible corresponding
to both normal and malicious traffic [2]. Many existing graph theories, anomaly detection,
classification, and clustering methods are failing on a real-life botnet dataset because of
high class imbalance, mixture and overlapping classes, noises, outliers and real-life uncertainties involved in the dataset. Therefore, the researchers need more realistic dataset to
experiment and evaluate their algorithms. But, one major obstacle to work with network
data is the restricted access due to privacy and security concerns. The main drawbacks of
publicly available botnet datasets to date that limits their applicability in network security
research are the following: (1) publicly available botnet datasets are created in an artificial
environment, (2) a real dataset is modified to erase private information, and (3) format of
the dataset is quite complex and require documentation and extensive amount of time to
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preprocess. Therefore, there is a necessity for a simulation algorithm that can generate
a real-life network dataset with botnet traffic while preserving the privacy of the original
network.
Besides the scarcity of publicly available botnet dataset, large-scale graph problems
are also introducing new challenges to the research community in the last two decades
[47, 48, 49, 50]. Many existing graph algorithms are becoming useless in terms of runtime
or memory issue as they were not designed to handle large-scale graphs. Therefore, there
is a necessity for a simulation algorithm that can generate a large-scale real-life network
dataset with botnet traffic while preserving the privacy of the original network.
In this research, we develop a simulation methodology based on the Markov chain and
role-mining that can simulate a large-scale botnet dataset from a given (real-life) botnet
dataset with similar degree distributions and community structures. More priority is given
while simulating the botnet subgraph (subgraph where only bot nodes act as source node)
to achieve similar botnet behavior. We also develop a scalable algorithm Enterprise connection algorithm to scale-up the simulated graph. We evaluate the performance of our
simulation algorithm in three major categories: (1) comparison of the botnet subgraph,
(2) comparison of the overall graph and (3) comparison of the scale-up graph. In all these
comparisons, we compare our simulated graph with the original graph and simulated graph
generated by Preferential attachment algorithm.
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3.1.1

Background and Related Literature

The lack of publicly available, properly formatted, and labeled botnet dataset creates a
need of simulated botnet dataset from a real-life botnet dataset. Organizations can simulate a dataset from their own original dataset using a simulator and provide the simulated
dataset to conduct research in the field of network security. Additionally, a scalable simulation algorithm can add the features of scaling-up the graph and thus it can be used in
analyzing scalability of different existing graph models and algorithms.
Graph simulation means generating a graph that possesses the features, characteristics
and patterns of a given graph. Despite the existence of several graph patterns in the literature, new graph patterns are still emerging. As now a days numerous research fields are
using graph as data and size of graphs is increasing, more new graph patterns are becoming visible. Therefore, in this section, we discuss few relevant graph properties at first,
following a review of literature on the existing graph simulators. Next, we discuss existing
research on role-mining method that is closely related to clustering. We use role-mining in
our proposed graph simulation algorithm.

3.1.1.1

Graph Laws and Patterns

Despite some dissimilarities among graphs, some similar patterns among them are often observed. These patterns together characterize naturally occurring graphs. We discuss
three common patterns often found in real-life netflow graphs as follows:
Power-law: In statistics, a power law is a functional relationship between two quantities, where one quantity varies as a power of another. The degree distribution of a graph
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is a power law if the number of nodes Nd with degree d is given byNd ∝ d−p where p
is called the power-law exponent and p > 0 [51]. Graphs that possess power-law degree
distributions are known as scale-free graphs. The power-law pattern of the indegree distribution of CTU-13 dataset scenario 5 is given in Figure 3.1. Skewed distribution such as
power laws have been found in several diversified phenomena, for example, in the study
of moon craters [52], internet, web and online social networks [53, 15, 13, 14], citation
graphs [54], biological taxonomy [55], sales data [56], natural language processing [57]
and many others. Though it is an established and most commonly observed pattern in
real-life graphs, deviations from the power-law pattern are also found in several real-life
phenomena [58, 59, 60].

Figure 3.1: Power law in indegree distribution of CTU-13 scenario-5 (log-log scale)
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Community Structure: A community is generally considered to be a set of nodes
who are closer to each other than to nodes outside of them (Figure 3.2). This effect has
been found in many real-world graphs, especially social networks. Flake et al. [61] found
communities of web pages in the WWW. Communities based on race and age in a network
of friendships in USA is found by Moody [62]. Detection of communities is considered
something really important in varieties of research. One of the reason is, each community represents individual work unit of the the overall system. For example, in metabolic
networks, such work units correspond to cycles or pathways; in the protein interaction
network, communities correspond to proteins with similar functionality inside a biological
cell; in citation networks, each community represent a research topic. Being able to identify these sub-structures within a network can provide insight into how network function
and topology affect each other [63]. Another important reason to consider communities is
that they often have very different properties than the average properties of the networks.
Thus, only concentrating on the average properties usually misses many important and
interesting features inside the networks.
Triangle is the the basic topological structure and major metric that represents the communities. The information about triangles is usually summarized in terms of clustering
coefficients which is widely used in the literature [64]. Let G be a simple undirected graph
with n vertices and m edges. Let T denote the number of triangles in the graph and W
be the number of wedges (a path of length 2). Then the global clustering coefficient is,
C=

3T
,
W

which measures how often friends of friends are also friends.
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Figure 3.2: A small network displaying community structure with three groups of nodes

Graph Diameter or Small-World Phenomena: Diameter of a network or graph is the
maximum number of edges required to connect any pair of nodes in that graph. Most reallife graphs exhibit relatively small diameter phenomenon, also known as the “small-world”
phenomenon, or “six degrees of separation” [65]. Calculation of diameters is affected by
nodes that are disconnected or outliers. That’s why, effective diameter is considered to be
more reliable pattern. Effective diameter or eccentricity is the minimum number of hops
in which some fraction (e.g., 80%) of all connected pairs of nodes can reach each other
[66]. The effective diameter seems to be small for real-life large graphs, for example,
19 for Web, 6 for social networks and around 12 for the Router-level graph of Internet
[67, 65, 53, 68].
Besides the above mentioned patterns, there exist several other noteworthy patterns in
the literature of graph analytic [64].
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3.1.1.2

Existing Graph Simulators

Graph simulation or generation is quite an interesting and challenging area to the research community of the theoretical computer science, physics, and mathematics.There are
several graph simulators in the existing literature.
Erdos–Renyi model [69, 12] is considered to be the origin of graph simulation. It
provides the first and the simplest model for generating a random graph. This model can
be defined as G(n, p) where is n number of nodes and p is the equal probability of edges
to be present in the graph. But this model was not designed to simulate real-life graphs.
As a result, ER model fails to simulate many desired properties of real-life graphs such as
power-law degree distribution, diameter, eigenvalues etc.
Most of the recent works on graph simulation belong to the category known as “Preferential Attachment”. Barabasi-Albert (BA) [13] is the first of this category where the
idea is to keep adding new nodes in the graph and prioritize the higher degree nodes while
making a new connection. This simple idea leads to power-law tails in the degree distribution. However, the diameter in this model grows slowly with the number of nodes, which
violates the “shrinking diameter” property mentioned in Section 3.1.1.1. Some alternate
versions of BA are the following: the modifications [70], the rewiring mechanism [71],
the copying mechanism [72], and the “winners don’t take all” model [58]. There are some
other generators [73, 74, 75] which simulate the degree distribution but fail to simulate
other properties.
Another category of graph-generation method seeks to simulate small diameter property of a real-life graph, for example, the “small-world” generator [76] and the Waxman
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generator [77]. BRITE [78] graph generator combines the idea of both the BA [13] and the
Waxman model [77]. The R-MAT [15] generator, belonging to this category, is one of the
major breakthroughs in graph simulation literature. R-MAT can simulate the power-law
and exception of power-law [58]. R-MAT is scalable and works for the directed, undirected, bipartite and weighted graph using the same approach. Notably, it has been selected
as the generator for the Graph 500 Supercomputer Benchmark [79]. Though R-MAT has
some desirable properties [17], it is not successful in simulating community effect, especially the high clustering coefficients [80].
Kronecker graph generation [17, 81, 16] is based on the matrix operation, the “Kronecker product”. This generator can simulate heavy-tailed distributions for in-degree, outdegree, eigenvalues, and eigenvectors. The researchers also demonstrate how a Kronecker
graphs can match the behavior of several real-life networks such as social networks, citations, web, and internet. But as this graph generation algorithm is not designed to simulate
topological structures, it usually fails to simulate the community structures specially for
sparse graphs.
Though the above models may produce heavy-tailed degree distributions, the clustering
coefficients of their simulated graph are often low [80]. For this reason, none of these models explain community structure which is one of the most striking features of interaction
graphs.
There exist several other models that particularly aim to simulate the community structure or in other words, clustering coefficient. Guo et al. [82], Bansal et al. [83], Newman’s
algorithm [84] and Gleeson’s algorithms [85] belong to this category.
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Guo et al. [82] produces a random graph by following power-law degree distributions
and then keep rewiring the edges to produce triangles. They continue the process as long
as it does not achieve the desired average clustering coefficients. This method fails to
simulate local clustering coefficients and thus the topological structures of the graph.
Bansal et al. [83] can be considered as an updated version of Guo et al [82]. They also
rewire edges, but based on different criteria than Guo et al. [82]. The process of Bansal et
al. [83] continues until it reaches the desired global clustering coefficient.
Newman’s algorithm [84] approached towards simulated local triangular structures.
This algorithm uses number of triangles and number of single edges to which each node is
involved as a parameter. But the problem of Newman’s algorithm is that it over-uses the
edges to produce the same number of triangles as in the real network.
Gleeson’s algorithm [85] generalizes Newman’s model by starting from other higherorder motif – a k clique, which is a complete graph among k nodes, each of which is
connected to every other node in the graph. This algorithm is expensive in terms of memory
and time constraint.
One of the latest work on simulating clustering coefficient is BTER [18]. This algorithm hypothesize that any graph with a heavy tailed degree distribution and community
structure contains a scale–free collection of dense Erdos–Renyi subgraphs. BTER used a
combination of Erdos–Renyi and Chung–Lu model [86, 87]. This approach mostly works
with dense graph and not suitable for sparse graph.
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3.1.1.3

Role Mining

Role-mining or role–discovery is a new concept compared to community–detection for
network data. Recently, Ryan and Ahmed [88] performed a descriptive and well-organized
survey on all the existing role discovery techniques in the literature.
According to RolX [89], there is a small difference between role–mining and role–
discovery. Role–discovery is the assignment of different nodes in a graph to different roles,
whereas role–mining concerns whether different nodes are allowed to access different roles
in a controlled environment. But both techniques use similar algorithms for clustering in
order to assign nodes to roles. However, in the literature, both role–discovery and role–
mining are used interchangeably. In this research, we use the term role–mining though we
do not consider access permission.
In RolX [89], the authors extracted several features for each node and created a large 2D
feature matrix. Non-negative matrix factorization (NMF) method was used to decompose
the feature matrix into the following two matrices: node by role and role by feature. RolX
showed that it is able to put similar nodes in the same role where each role has distinct
characteristics. The authors used these roles for graph matching, sense making and transfer
learning. RolX is linearly scalable with the number of edges.
Somaiya et al. [90] used Bayesian framework for role clustering and developed a
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) based algorithm that allows a single node to participate in multiple roles. This approach is not scalable for large graphs. Gilpin et al. [91]
studied the possibility of using external requirements for role discovery. The authors developed a framework, Guided Learning for Role Discovery (GLRD) that models the role
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detection problem as a constrained NMF problem. The authors improved the efficiency
by using least square formulation rather than optimizing the whole matrices. Ruan and
Parthasarathy [92] developed a novel algorithm, RC-Joint to detect both community and
roles from a network. Soft k-means was used on structural features to identify the roles.
Rossi et al. [93] developed a role detection method for a dynamic environment, where a
series of network snapshots are available. This technique detect roles for each snapshot first
and then calculate the transition of roles over snapshots. Next, they analyze the temporal
pattern of role changing for each node. This technique is applicable in anomaly detection
and nodal behavior prediction.

3.1.2

Research Gap

Since around 2010, the scarcity of an effective botnet dataset has been extensively
studied. Shiravi et al. [2] and Christian et al. [94] highly emphasized this issue. Due to lack
of available and convenient botnet dataset, researchers in network security are struggling
to experiment with the existing and new algorithms. The need of varieties of botnet dataset
and reliable large-scale graph dataset is becoming more evident. Existing studies suggested
several characteristics of an ideal botnet dataset, but the process to create or capture such
dataset faces several trade-offs such as ensuring data privacy while keeping transparency
[94, 2]. Because of the security and privacy concerns, many organizations cannot publish
the original real-life graphs. Therefore, there is a clear need of a simulation algorithm that
can simulate large-scale netflow datasets containing botnet traffic.
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Garcia et al. [4] tried to ensure all the characteristics mentioned by [94, 2] in their
CTU-13 netflow dataset which is a real, labeled botnet dataset. Because of its real-life
characteristics, the CTU-13 dataset can be used as a seed graph to a graph simulator. But
this dataset is also smaller compared to today’s large-scale dataset. Because of its real-life
characteristics, the CTU-13 dataset can be used as a seed graph to a graph simulator, but the
simulated graph needs to be scaled-up to create a large-scale dataset. This triggers the need
of implementation of an efficient graph simulation algorithm. As mentioned above, there
exist several popular graph simulation algorithms, but graph simulation is a challenging
field. There is no existing universal graph simulators to date that can perform well in
all types of graph. Depending on the graph size, sparsity, density, directed, undirected,
weighted/ unweighted, single edge/ multi-edge, there are varieties of simulation algorithms
out there. In terms of simulating degree distributions, some graph simulators achieved
quite a good accuracy. But, all of the graph simulation algorithms are facing challenges
with simulating topological structures.
Triangle is one of the most useful metrics that represents the topological structures
of a graph and measures social unity. Several important characteristics of social network
such as homophily (people become friends with those similar to themselves) and transitivity (friends of friends become friends) can be explained by triangles. Similar interesting
behaviors that can be explained by triangles are mentioned in literature [95, 96, 97]. Triangles have also been used in graph mining applications such as spam detection and finding
common topics on the WWW [98, 99]. But, from Section 3.1.1.2, we can see that all
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the existing graph simulators are having issues in solving the problem of simulating local
triangles. It is still an open area that requires more research to be conducted.
The above research gaps suggest that more research is needed in developing graph
simulation algorithms that can simulate large-scale botnet dataset containing both botnet
and normal traffic along with the topological structures similar to a given graph.

3.1.3

Contributions

To fill the gaps in the literature, we introduced a graph simulation algorithm that can
simulate a large-scale graph containing both botnet and normal traffic in it. The simulator
provides priority to the accuracy of simulating the botnet behavior compared to the normal
traffic. Our simulation algorithm can simulate triangles and the associated degrees of each
node, thereby preserves the community structure. The contributions of this research are
the following:
• Develop a new simulation algorithm based on Markov chain and role-mining that
simulates a netflow graph with both normal and botnet traffic
• Prioritize the simulation of botnet behavior
• Simulate triangle and degree distributions
• Develop a new scaling-up algorithm, Enterprise connection algorithm suitable for
distributed system
• Compare the botnet behavior with the original graph and the simulated graph generated by Preferential attachment algorithm
• Compare the complete simulated graph containing both normal and botnet traffic
with the original graph and the simulated graph generated by Preferential attachment
algorithm
• Compare the scaled-up simulated graph
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3.2

Problem Description and Hypothesis
In this research, we study the problem of simulating a real-life, large-scale netflow

dataset with both normal and botnet traffic in it. Our goal is to simulate a large-scale botnet
dataset similar to a given botnet dataset that preserves indegree, outdegree and topological
structures (triangles) of each node while hiding the identity of the nodes in the original
graph. We also want to emphasize more on simulating the botnet behaviour.
We use a Markov chain based simulation to maintain correlation while connecting
nodes rather than some degree-based approach. In the Preferential attachment algorithm,
when making a new connection, priority is given to the node that has the highest degree. In
case of multiple nodes having the highest degree, the tie is broken by randomly choosing
one of those nodes. This simple degree-based rule of the Preferential attachment algorithm
helps to simulate the power-law pattern. In this research, we assume that the connection
between the two nodes should not necessarily be based on the highest degree. Rather, it
is important to consider the clusters (roles) to which the communicating nodes belong.
Therefore, we incorporate the probability of connection between the nodes from different roles. Markov chain provides a way of modeling this behavior, where the transition
probability matrix represents the probability of the next connection between two roles. After selective the destination role using the transition probability matrix, we use either the
highest degree or ARND (a new parameter defined by us) to select the destination node.
We use role–mining to make the Markov chain process computationally feasible for
large graphs. Without role–mining, if we want to compute the transition probabilities of
each node in a network with Markov chain, the computation of state transition probabilities
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becomes computationally infeasible, even for a small network. Therefore, the transition
probability matrix mentioned above represents the probability of connection between roles.
In our simulation methodology, there is a separate scale-up algorithm to produce a largescale botnet dataset.
We implement our methodology on a real-life botnet dataset named CTU-13. This
dataset is the only real-life, publicly available labeled botnet dataset which contains varieties of bots in it. For details of the dataset, we refer readers to[4].

3.2.1

Hypothesis

We plan to develop a simulation methodology using the concept of role-mining [88].
Role–mining is a clustering approach that defines meaningful roles (clusters) of the nodes
in a network based on the graph properties of the nodes. Our simulation approach is based
on the hypothesis that nodes in a network are divided into several roles such as server,
router, personal machine, university machine, and so on where each role usually communicates with some other roles in a certain frequency. So, there is a possibility that there are
some communication patterns between bot role and some other role. There may be some
roles that are communicating more with bot roles compared to other roles in the network.
Consider a simple example to understand the concept of role-mining. We consider a
network where the nodes can be grouped into the following four roles: role A, role B,
role C and role D. Each role has its own feature values as shown in Table 3.1. In Figure
3.3, we draw a small part of the network with 8 nodes and 4 roles. Here role A has 4
communications with role B, 2 communications with role C and no communication with
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role D. So, when simulating outgoing edges for nodes in role A, we can use the connectivity
information with role B, C and D of the original graph to simulate destination nodes.

Figure 3.3: Communication among the roles in a small network

Table 3.1: An example of roles for the nodes in a network

Role A
Role B
Role C
Role D

3.3

Indegree

Outdegree

Number of Triangles

Low
High
Medium
High

High
Medium
Low
Low

Low
Low
Low
High

Simulation Methodology
This section describes the simulation methodology in detail. There are six major steps

in our proposed simulation methodology. In the first step, we calculate some simple node
features from the given graph. Next, we perform role-mining to group the nodes into roles.
As our simulation procedure uses the role-mining (clustering) technique and the Markov
chain to simulate the desired graph, we calculate several other properties (ARND, Transition probability matrices) related to roles and the Markov chain. Then we simulate the
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triangles followed by the simulation of the remaining graph (remaining nodes and edges).
The architecture of the simulation technique is demonstrated in Figure 3.4.
We use this role-mining approach to enhance the computational speed and efficiency
of the Markov chain in our simulation methodology. Dividing the nodes into roles speeds
up the Markov chain based simulation approach. Abundant of research is ongoing to accurately detect the nodes in bot role from the network data. We also developed a bot detection
methodology in Chapter II. In this research, role-mining can be considered as an optional
step. We perform role-mining step only if the role information is not provided by the user.
As the accuracy of role-mining is not the focus of this research, we use simple graph properties and clustering algorithms to group the nodes into roles. We use Gaussian mixture
algorithm for clustering with indegree, outdegree, number of triangles as features. If the
role information is not given, we group the nodes based on only their degrees and triangles.
As one of our goal in this research is to generate a large-scale simulated graph similar
to the original graph, we develop a scaling-up algorithm, named as Enterprise connection
algorithm to simulate a large-scale graph in a distributed system. Enterprise connection algorithm is independent of the simulation methodology mentioned above and thus does not
affect any of the above steps. So, this algorithm can be used with Preferential attachment
algorithm as well. This algorithm executes the above mentioned simulation steps in every
processor and combines the results to produce the large-scale simulated graph. Enterprise
connection algorithm is discussed after discussing the six major steps mentioned above.
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The following subsections describe the calculation of node features, computation of
role information, randomization of node identities, algorithms for simulating triangles and
the remaining graph and the algorithm to scale-up the simulated graph.

Figure 3.4: Architecture of the simulation methodology

3.3.1

Calculation of Node Features

In this step, we calculate the four features of each node from the given graph. These
features are indegree, outdegree, number of triangles, list of nodes involved in triangles
(neighbors are calculated considering the graph as undirected and single-edge). These
properties are used in role–mining and also as parameters in the simulation process. When
calculating indegree and outdegree, we consider the graph as directed and allow multiple
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edges between nodes. But when calculating the number of triangles and neighbors involved
in each triangle, we consider the graph as undirected and allow only a single edge between
nodes. Definition of triangles in a multi-directed graph is quite complex. To our knowledge, there is no existing algorithm that can simulate triangles for a multi-directed graph
(directed graph with multiple edges between nodes), not even for an undirected single-edge
graph (no universal method exists). Triangle simulation or in other words, simulation of
clustering coefficient is still an open problem.
The pseudo-code of calculating the node features are given in Algorithm 1 We illustrate
the procedure of calculating the number of triangles and list of neighbors involved in triangles using a small sample graph demonstrated in Figure 3.5a with the respective property
table given in Table 3.2. There are five nodes in the graph shown in the example and each
of them involved in a different number of triangles. For each node that has at least one
triangle associated with it, we list the neighbors involved in those triangles and then we
delete the node from the graph. This allows us to avoid considering the same triangle three
times for each of the associated nodes. For example, after considering all the triangles for
node 111.11.11.11 in Figure 3.5a, we remove node 111.11.11.11 from the graph. So, the
remaining graph becomes as shown in Figure 3.5b. Next, for node 111.11.11.12, we find
out the list of neighbors involved in triangles from Figure 3.5b. Similarly, for the node
111.11.11.13 the resulting graph is shown in Figure 3.5c.
For each node, we add one extra column named as Row ID in the property table shown
in Table 3.2. The reason for adding this column will be described in Section 3.3.4.
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(a) Sample small graph with triangles

(c) Graph
111.11.11.12

(b) Graph
111.11.11.11

after

removing

node

after

removing

node

Figure 3.5: Calculation of list of neighbors involved in triangles

Table 3.2: Node property table for the above Figure
Row Id
Node
Number of Triangles List of Neighbours Participated
in Triangles
1
111.11.11.11
4
111.11.11.12, 111.11.11.13,
111.11.11.13, 111.11.11.14,
111.11.11.12, 111.11.11.15,
111.11.11.13, 111.11.11.15
2
111.11.11.12
3
111.11.11.13, 111.11.11.15
3
111.11.11.13
4
4
111.11.11.14
1
5
111.11.11.15
3
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Algorithm 1 Calculate Node Properties
1: function C ALCULATE -P ROPERTIES(G)
2:
properties ← Empty table
3:
undirG ← Undirected and single edge version of G
4:
tempG ← Copy of undirectedG
5:
rowId ← 0
6:
for each node n in G do
7:
neighbours ← F IND -N EIGHBOURS(tempG, n)
8:
Insert rowId,n.name,n.indegree(G),n.outdegree(G),n.triangles(undirG)
9:
and neighbours in properties
10:
rowId ← increase by 1
11:
Remove n and its associated edges from tempG
12:
for each row r in properties do
13:
IDs ← Find rowIds in properties for each item in r.neighbours
14:
r.neighbours ← IDs
15:
return properties
function F IND -N EIGHBOURS(G, n)
triangleN eighbours ← Empty list
allN eighbours ← Neighbours of n in G
for all combination of n1, n2 in allN eighbours do
if n1, n2 has edge in G then
Add n1 in triangleN eighbours
Add n2 in triangleN eighbours
23:
return triangleN eighbours

16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:

3.3.2

Role-Mining

Our proposed simulation approach is based on the hypothesis that there are patterns
in communications among the groups (roles) of nodes. The main focus of this research
is graph simulation using role information. Thus the validation of role-mining is not the
focus of this research. So, if the given graph is labeled with known roles then we take that
information as input. If there is any partial information about the roles, we also utilize it
to define the role as accurately as possible. Otherwise, we perform a simple role-mining
algorithm to group the nodes into roles. For example, in the next section, we use CTU-13
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Netflow dataset in our experimentation which does not have any role information. But, it
provides some knowledge of the bot nodes. So, we group the bot nodes into a role and
group the remaining nodes into another 24 roles, in total 25 roles.
In our experiment, if the role information is not given by the user, we use a simple
clustering algorithm known as Gaussian Mixture Algorithm. We choose this algorithm
because of its simplicity, computational speed, and flexibility of dividing data into a desired
number of roles. We use Python Scikit-learn package to implement Gaussian Mixture
Algorithm for role-mining.
Gaussian Mixture Algorithm: A Gaussian mixture model is a probabilistic model that
assumes all the data points are generated from a mixture of a finite number of Gaussian
distributions with unknown parameters. One can think of mixture models as generalizing
k-means clustering to incorporate information about the covariance structure of the data as
well as the centers of the latent Gaussians.
Scikit-learn implements different classes to estimate Gaussian mixture models, that
correspond to different estimation strategies. The Gaussian Mixture object implements
the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm for fitting mixture-of-Gaussian models. It
can also draw confidence ellipsoids for multivariate models, and compute the Bayesian
Information Criterion to assess the number of clusters (roles) in the data.

3.3.3

Calculation of Role Information

In this step, we calculate the transition probability matrices using the role information
found in the previous step and the given graph (netflow data). Transition probability ma57

trices is a mandatory property for the Markov chain. As it is computationally infeasible to
calculate the transition probability matrix for each node, our transition probability matrix
contains the probability of the next connection between two roles. We have one transition
probability matrix for each role. An example is given in Table 3.3. Let’s assume this transition probability matrix is for role A. The value 0.8 in the 2nd column of the 1st row means
that, if a node in role A is currently connected with another node in role A, then there is
80% possibility that the next connection will be with a node in role B. In this way, we use
the transition probability matrix to select the next destination role.

Table 3.3: Transition probability matrix for role A
A
B
C
A 0.1 0.8 0.1
B 0.6 0.1 0.3
C 0.9 0.05 0.05

We also calculate Average Role-Neighbor Degree (ARND) when bot role is acting
as a source role. For example, when bot nodes are acting as source nodes, let’s assume
they communicate with 10 unique nodes of role A making 200 communications (edges),
with 15 unique nodes of role B making 150 communications. So, the ARND is [(A: 20),
(B: 10)]. After choosing the destination role using the transition probability matrix, we
use ARND or the highest degree to choose the next destination node. We already stated
earlier that we prioritize the simulation of botnet behavior than the complete graph and this
ARND helps us to achieve better results in simulating botnet subgraph. For the remaining
graph we want to simulate the power-law pattern and therefore ARND is not useful for the
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rest of the graph. Botnet subgraphs (only bot nodes act as source node) do not follow the
usual power-law pattern. The pseudo-code to calculate these two properties are given in
Algorithm 2.

Algorithm 2 Calculate Role Information
1: function C ALCULATE -ROLE -I NFORMATION(G, nRole, nodeRole) . nRole=Number
of roles, nodeRole=Dictionary that contains role for each node
2:
roleT P M ← Dict()
. Store the transition probability matrix for each role
3:
roleN odeDegree ← Dict()
. Use to generate ARND
4:
for each role r in nRole do
5:
tpr ← array[nRole X nRole]
6:
rSource ← Use G and nodeRole to find netflows where r acted as source
7:
for prev ← 0, len(rSource) do
8:
curr ← prev + 1
9:
prevRole ← role of node at rSource[prev]
10:
currRole ← role of node at rSource[curr]
11:
tpr[prevRole][currRole] ← tpr[prevRole][currRole] + 1
12:
if prevRole is BotRole then
13:
roleN odeDegree[(prevRole, rSource[prevRole])]
←
roleN odeDegree[(prevRole, rSource[prevRole])] + 1
14:
tpr ← divide each cell in a row by sum(row) in tpr
15:
roleT P M [r] ← tpr
16:
Use roleN odeDegree to calculate ARN D
17:
return roleT P M , ARN D

3.3.4

Randomization of Node Identities

In our simulation methodology, it is necessary to hide the identities of the original
nodes in the simulated graph. There are two possible ways we can do that while preserving
the degrees and community structures (triangles). One way is to rename the nodes, for
example, if one node has IP address of 148.23.161.11, we can rename it to a completely
different IP address such as 111.12.76.198 or provide a random unique number such as
1891. This renaming can be done in any possible way as the user wants. Another more
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simple way is to shuffle the IP addresses of the nodes. If we are not scaling-up the simulated
graph, we choose to shuffle the node IP addresses because it keeps the node names more
realistic. But, when scaling-up the simulated graph to create a large-scale graph, we need
to generate random names for each node in each processor instead of shuffling. Otherwise,
same IP address appears p times where p is the number of processor.
Whichever way we choose, this randomization step causes one problem in the property
table calculated in Section 3.3.1. In the property table, in the column list of neighbours , if
we store the IP addresses of the nodes, then in this step after randomization, the list will be
misrepresenting. To solve this problem, we provide an unique row id to each of the rows in
the property table found after the calculation of node features step in Section 3.3.1. Instead
of storing the IP addresses in the neighbor list, we store the unique row number of those
neighbors. This approach solves the problem because simulation of triangles depends on
the node properties (indegree, outdegree, number of triangles) rather than the name of the
nodes. An example of what a property table look like after the calculation of node features
step in Section 3.3.1 and after randomization of node identities step are given in Table 3.4.
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Table 3.4: Randomize node identities
Row ID

Node

Number of Triangles

1
2
3
4
5

111.11.11.11
111.11.11.12
111.11.11.13
111.11.11.14
111.11.11.15

4
3
4
1
3

List of Neighbours Participated
in Triangles
2, 3, 3, 4, 2, 5, 3, 5
3,5

(a) Before randomization

Row ID

Node

Number of Triangles

1
2
3
4
5

111.11.11.13
111.11.11.15
111.11.11.11
111.11.11.12
111.11.11.14

4
3
4
1
3

List of Neighbours Participated
in Triangles
2, 3, 3, 4, 2, 5, 3, 5
3, 5

(b) After randomization

Therefore, after the randomization of node identities step, we have the following four
parameters to pass to the next step of the simulation process: 1) randomized property table,
2) transition probability matrices, 3) ARND for bot role, 4) list of nodes belong to each
role, and 5) number of netflows to simulate for each role.

3.3.5

Simulation of Triangles

As a first step toward simulating the netflow graph with botnet traffic on it, we simulate
the triangles. For the list of nodes that has nonempty list of neighbors in the property table,
we simulate triangles for each of them. For each node in that list we select two consecutive
neighbors from the list of neighbors and connect edges if no edge exist between them.
Then we decrease the number of indegree, outdegree and number of triangles for all three
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nodes accordingly. For each node, the process continues as long as there is neighbors in the
list. The pseudo code of this process is given in Algorithm 3. The output of this triangle
simulation step is a small simulated graph that we pass to the next step. The next step add
more edges and nodes in the simulated graph.

Algorithm 3 Simulate Triangles
1: function S IMULATE -T RIANGLES(properties)
2:
simuGraph ← Empty graph
3:
for each node x in properties that has triangle > 0 do
4:
for i ← 0, len(x.neighbours) − 1, 2 do
5:
y ← x.neighbours[i]
6:
z ← x.neighbours[i + 1]
7:
if x and y has no edge in simuGraph then
8:
If x.outdegree > 0, add edge from x to y in simuGraph
9:
If x.outdegree <= 0, add edge from y to x in simuGraph
10:
if x and z has no edge in simuGraph then
11:
If x.outdegree > 0, add edge from x to z in simuGraph
12:
If x.outdegree <= 0, add edge from z to x in simuGraph
13:
if y and z has no edge in simuGraph then
14:
If y.outdegree > 0, add edge from y to z in simuGraph
15:
If y.outdegree <= 0, add edge from z to y in simuGraph
16:
Decrease indegree, outdegree, triangles of x, y, z in properties
17:
accordingly
18:
return properties, simuGraph

3.3.6

Simulation of Remaining Graph

In this step, we simulate the remaining nodes and edges related to botnet, normal and
background netflows. The process starts by selecting each of the roles as source role, S.
Then we start by selecting each source node A from role S. Let’s say the outdegree of A is
Ad . As long as Ad > 0 , we choose the destination role, D for next communication using
the transition probability matrix of that role. After selecting the destination role, D, we
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select the destination node B from that role using either the highest degree or ARND. If S
is bot role then we choose ARND in this step otherwise, we choose the highest degree to
select B. When using ARND, we select a node that has a minimum degree mentioned in
ARND. Next min(Ad , Bd ) connections are made between the source node A and destination node B and the respective degrees are adjusted. Here, Bd is the indegree of B. This
process continues as long as there is netflows to simulate. The pseudo code of this process
is demonstrated in Algorithm 4.
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Algorithm 4 Simulate Remaining Graph
1: function S IMULATE -R EMAINING -G RAPH(properties, nRole, roleTPM, simuGraph)
2:
for each role r in nRole do
3:
tpm ← roleT P M [r]
4:
srcN odes ← nodes from properties in role r and outdegree >= 1
5:
nN odes ← len(srcN odes)
6:
while nN odes > 0 do
7:
src ← random(srcN odes)
8:
prevRole ← generate a random role from nRole
9:
dst ← F IND -N ODE B Y ROLE(properties, prevRole, ARN D)
10:
Add min(src.outdegree,dst.indegree) edge between src, dst
11:
in simuGraph
12:
Update indegree, outdegree of dst, src in properties
13:
while src.outdegree > 0 do
14:
randP rob ← generate random probability
15:
sumP rob ← 0
16:
for currRole ← 0, nRole do
17:
sumP rob ← sumP rob + roleT P M [prevRole][currRole]
18:
if sumP rob > randP rob then
19:
prevRole ← currRole
20:
dst ← F IND -N ODE B Y ROLE(properties, prevRole, ARN D)
21:
Add min(src.outdegree,dst.indegree) edge between src, dst
22:
in simuGraph
23:
Update indegree, outdegree of dst, src in properties
24:
break
25:
Remove src from srcN odes
26:
nN odes ← nN odes − 1
27:
return simuGraph
function F IND -N ODE B Y ROLE(properties, r, ARND)
nodes ← Empty list
if role is BotRole then
nodes ← nodes from properties in r role with indegree >= ARN D[role]
else
nodes ← highest degree nodes from properties within role r
34:
if nodes is Empty then
35:
nodes ← nodes from properties which has indegree >= 1
36:
return random(nodes)

28:
29:
30:
31:
32:
33:
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3.3.7

Enterprise Connection Algorithm (Scaling-up)

In this algorithm, we assume that our simulated large graph consists of many enterprises
(subgraphs) with varying size, characteristics and topology linked together to form a large
network. To establish connection between enterprises, we choose few nodes with high
degree (indegree or outdegree) as they are likely to be server. An example of enterprise
connection algorithm is given in Figure 3.6. We see that there are five enterprises in Figure
3.6. A node with high degree is selected from each enterprise to connect the enterprise
with each other. The red edges in Figure 3.6 represent the inter-enterprise connection.

Figure 3.6: Connection between different enterprises

The steps of our enterprise connection algorithm is presented in Algorithm 5. If our
goal is to generate a simulated graph that is P times larger than the original graph, then this
algorithm will execute right after the 3.3.1 step of our simulation procedure. The enterprise
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connection algorithm requires P processors where each processors execute the following
steps: 3.3.2,3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.5, and 3.3.6. As the results from role mining algorithm are
different for each of the P processors, each of the simulated graph generated by each
processor will have random variations from each other. After generating simulated graphs
in each of the processors, we have P different disconnected subgraphs (enterprises). Next,
we choose N nodes with highest indegree and N nodes with highest outdegree from each
of the subgraphs. We calculate the desired number of connections, E among enterprises.
We randomly choose a source node from the set of nodes with highest outdegree and a
destination node from the set of nodes with highest indegree and add an edge between
the selected nodes. This process continues until the desired number of connections (E) is
reached. We can control E using another parameter called fraction, F .

Algorithm 5 Enterprise connection algorithm
1: function E NTERPRISE -C ONNECTION -A LGORITHM(F, N, P)
2:
Calculate node features
3:
Simulate individual enterprise using algorithm 1-4 in each processor
4:
N 1 ← Select top N nodes with highest indegree from each enterprise
5:
N 2 ← Select top N nodes with highest outdegree from each enterprise
6:
E ←F∗N∗P∗2
7:
for i ← 0, E do
8:
Randomly choose a source node from N 2
9:
Randomly choose a destination node from N 1
10:
Connect these two nodes

3.4

Results and Discussion
In this section, we evaluate the quality of our simulated graph and compare the simi-

larity of the simulated graph to the original graph. Here, we also compare the performance
of our simulation methodology with the Preferential attachment algorithm mentioned in
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Section 3.1.1.2. Scenario 5, 7, 11 and 12 of the CTU-13 Netflow dataset is used in our numerical experiments to validate our proposed simulation methodology. Table 3.5 provides
a summary of the number of nodes, edges, bot nodes in each of these scenarios. We implement our methodology using Python 2.7 along with the following packages: Scikit-learn,
OpenCV, Networkx, Numpy and Pandas.
We designed the Enterprise connection algorithm in such way that it is suitable for a
parallel and distributed system. This algorithm is capable of generating a graph of size m
where m is linearly scalable with the number of processors. Due to hardware limitation,
we perform our experimentation on an Intel core i3 machine with 4 GB RAM and 1.9 GHz
processor speed. We used 3 processor to test the scalability of the Enterprise connection
algorithm.
The experimental results are organized in three major categories: (1) comparison of
the botnet subgraphs among the original, simulated and preferential (2) comparison of the
overall graphs among the original, simulated and preferential and (3) comparison of the
scaled-up graphs among the original, simulated and preferential. We demonstrate the comparison among botnets by providing (i) comparison of the graph statistics and (ii) comparison by visualizing the graphs. To compare the overall graphs, we compare the following
results: (i) graph statistics (ii) histograms of the indegree, outdegree, and triangles. As the
size of the overall graphs are quite large, comparison using a visualization approach is not
very helpful for overall graphs. The graph statistics used in the comparison of the results
are described below followed by the experimental results.
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Scenario
Sc5
Sc7
Sc11
Sc12

3.4.1

Table 3.5: Experimental dataset
Nodes Edges
Bots
41658 129832
1
38204 114077
1
41931 107251
3
94434 325471
3

Graph Statistics Used in Comparison

Following are the graph statistics we use to compare the botnets and overall graphs in
next sections.
Average Degree:
Let d(vi ) be the degree of vertexvi and n be the number of vertices in total. The average
degree of G is defined in equation (3.1).
P

d(G) =

1≤i≤n

n

d(vi )

(3.1)

Graph Diameter:
The diameter of a graph is the length maxu,v d(u, v) of the "longest shortest path"
between any two vertices (u, v) of the graph, where d(u, v) is the shortest graph distance.
In other words, graph diameter is the shortest distance between the two most distant nodes
in the network.
Modularity:
Modularity is a measure of the structure of networks or graphs. It is designed to measure the strength of division of a network into modules (also called groups, clusters or
communities). Networks with high modularity have dense connections between the nodes
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within modules but sparse connections between nodes in different modules. Modularity is
often used in optimization methods for detecting community structure in networks.

3.4.2

Comparison of Botnet Subgraph

In this section, we compare the botnet subgraphs simulated using our approach and
Preferential attachment algorithm with the original botnet subgraph of CTU-13 Netflow
dataset. Here, the term botnet subgraph means the subgraph where the bot nodes act as a
source node. The comparison is conducted based on the graph statistics mentioned earlier
and visualization approach.

3.4.2.1

Comparison of Graph Statistics

We use Gephi to calculate the number of nodes, average degree and modularity of the
botnet subgraphs. Network diameter is used in the next section while comparing the overall
graphs.
In Figure 3.7, we compare the number of nodes in the original, simulated and preferential botnet subgraphs in all four scenarios of the CTU-13 dataset. For botnet subgraphs,
the number of destination nodes is quite higher than the number of source nodes. While
simulating botnet, the number of source nodes (bot nodes) is known but the number of
destination nodes is unknown. We calculate the destination roles using Markov chain and
then find the destination nodes from that role using ARND. Therefore, the number of destination nodes in the simulated botnet graph may vary from the original botnet graph. We
see from Figure 3.7 that our simulated botnets have a similar number of nodes in all the
four scenarios whereas out of the four botnets simulated by Preferential attachment algo69

rithm only scenario 11 has a similar number of nodes. Though scenario 12 has more nodes
compared to other scenarios, our simulation approach performed well in this scenario as
in other scenarios. As Preferential attachment algorithm always prefers a node with the
highest degree as the destination node, simulated graph generated by this algorithm has
less variation in destination nodes.

Figure 3.7: Comparison of the number of nodes in botnets

Figure 3.8 shows the average degree for the original, simulated and preferential botnet
subgraphs in all four scenarios. For all scenarios of the CTU-13 dataset, the simulated
botnet has almost the same average degree as the original botnet, except for scenario 11.
The botnet of scenario 11 has a comparatively higher number of edges compared to the
number of nodes (number of nodes is 12, number of edges is 8164). Our simulated botnet
has 10 nodes instead of 12 and that caused such differences in average degree of the nodes
in scenario 11. Preferential attachment algorithm achieved a similar average degree only
in scenario 11 (dense graph) and failed to produce similar average degrees for scenario 5,
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7 and 12 (sparse graphs). It seems Preferential attachment algorithm performed well only
for dense graphs.

Figure 3.8: Comparison of the average degree of botnets

Modularity is the graph measure which is related to the community structures (clusters) in the graph. In Figure 3.9, we see that scenario 5, 7, and 11 have modularity of
approximately 0 in the original botnet and so is in our simulated botnet. Original botnet
in scenario 12 has a high modularity value of 0.46 and our simulated graph has a value of
0.47. Therefore, our simulation methodology performed well while simulating the clusters
in the botnet. The yellow bars demonstrating the modularity values found in the botnet
subgraph generated by Preferential attachment algorithm. We can see that in scenario 5
and 7 Preferential attachment algorithm successfully simulated the modularity but failed
to do so in scenario 12 even though three of these graphs are sparse graphs. It failed for
the dense graph in scenario 11 as well. While connecting the nodes and edges Preferential
attachment algorithm does not consider anything related to communities or clusters. There71

fore the communities (and modularity) generated by the Preferential attachment algorithm
might be random.

Figure 3.9: Comparison of the modularity of botnets

3.4.2.2

Comparison using Visualization

In this research, in addition to simulating communities and other properties for the
overall graphs, our simulation methodology emphasizes especially on simulating the botnet
subgraph. The botnets of scenario 5 and 7 are quite small compared to the botnets of
scenario 11 and 12. There is only one bot in scenario 5 and 7 and three bots in scenario
11 and 12. To visualize how similar our simulated botnets and preferential botnet are to
the original botnets, in this section we visualize and compare two botnets from scenario 11
and 12. We have drawn these graphs using ForceAtlas2 layout of Gephi.
From Figure 3.21a and 3.10b, we can see that the main pattern of the original botnet
and simulated botnet are the same. The three big clusters on three ends are visible in both
the original and the simulated graph. But, the small clusters in the center area seems a bit
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different than the original to simulated. In the original one, there are few clusters in center
area and nodes within each cluster are strongly connected. But in the simulated botnet, the
nodes in the center area are scattered individually or into several small clusters. These few
small differences can be considered as normal randomness of a real-life dataset. Now, if
we compare the botnet subgraph generated by Preferential attachment algorithm with the
original botnet subgraph in Figure 3.10c and 3.10a, we can see that there is not much of
similarity. As, we draw three of these botnet subgraphs (original, simulated and preferential) using the same graph layout algorithm (ForceAtlas2), the similarities and differences
are quite visible at a quick glance.

(a) Original

(b) Simulated

(c) Preferential

Figure 3.10: Visualization of scenario 12 botnet (original vs simulated vs preferential)

Figure 3.11 contains similar botnet subgraphs (original, simulated and preferential)
of scenario 11. If we compare our simulated botnet subgraph with the original botnet
subgraph in Figure 3.11b and 3.11a, at first glance, the two graphs may look different but
basically they are quite similar. They look different because of the way Gephi draw it.
The same graph can be drawn in many different ways by changing the node positions only.
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There is a major triangular shape in both original and simulated graphs defined by nodes
A, B and C. In both graphs, A is connected with two other nodes besides the triangular
connections. Same is true for nodes in the position of B. The only difference is two nodes
that are connected with C, in original graph they are not connected with any of A and B,
but in simulated graph they got connected with A. Now, if we compare the botnet subgraph
generated by Preferential attachment algorithm with the original botnet subgraph in Figure
3.11c and 3.11a, we see that there is no similarity in the layout or community structures.

(a) Original

(b) Simulated

(c) Preferential

Figure 3.11: Visualization of scenario 11 botnet (original vs simulated vs preferential)

3.4.3

Comparison of Overall Graph

In this section, we compare the overall simulated graph using our simulation methodology and Preferential attachment algorithm with the original overall graph. Here, the term
overall graph means graph with botnet, normal and background activities. We compare
the simulated and the original graphs based on graph statistics and histograms of indegree,
outdegree, and triangles. As the overall graph contains more than 100K of nodes and 300K
74

of edges, a comparison using a visualization approach is not an effective way for the overall
graphs.

3.4.3.1

Comparison of Graph Statistics

We compute the following graph statistics– average degree, modularity and network
diameter for the original and simulated graphs to validate our proposed graph simulation
methodology. As we already mentioned before, Gephi is used to compute all the graph
statistics.
Comparison of the average degree among the original, simulated and preferential graphs
are demonstrated in Figure 3.12. We see that the simulated graphs generated using our simulation approach have exactly the same average degree as the original graph in all the four
scenarios of the CTU-13 dataset. But, the graphs generated by Preferential attachment algorithm have similar average degrees for scenario 5, 7 and 11 which are small graphs but
failed to produce similar average degree for scenario 12 which is a comparatively larger
graph in size.
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Figure 3.12: Comparison of average degrees of overall graphs

As we mentioned before modularity is related to community structures and thus it is
related to triangles as well. Simulation of triangles or community structures is still an
open problem which is not solved yet. It is a hard and challenging problem and numerous
research are ongoing to achieve better accuracy in simulating triangles. Our simulation
technique also has one limitation while simulating triangles as mentioned earlier in Section
3.4.3.2. Despite that limitation, the modularity of our simulated graphs are very close to
the values of the original graphs. The modularity of our simulated graph are almost same
as the original graphs for scenarios 5, 11 and slightly higher for scenarios 7 and 12. The
graphs generated by Preferential attachment algorithm also performed well and achieved
similar modularity values for scenario 7 and 12 and slightly different for scenario 5 and 11.
One thing to remember here is that CTU-13 graphs are quite sparse graphs and the
number of triangles (communities) involved in each scenario (e.g. 5, 7, 11 or 12) are
quite low compared to the number of nodes and edges involved in that scenario. Thus
comparison of the overall graphs’ modularity may not reflect properly how well each of
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these simulation algorithms performed in simulating each of the small communities. That’s
why we also present an in-depth comparison using histograms in next Section 3.4.3.2.

Figure 3.13: Comparison of modularity of overall graphs

We see from Figure 3.14, that the diameter of our simulated graphs are similar to the
original graph for scenario 5, 7 and 11 and quite high for scenario 12 only. Preferential attachment algorithm achieved similar values for scenario 7, 11 and 12 but failed for scenario
5.
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Figure 3.14: Comparison of network diameter of overall graphs

3.4.3.2

Comparison of Histograms

As a part of our validation process, we compare histograms of the overall graphs simulated by our simulation technique and Preferential attachment algorithm with the original
graph of scenario 5,7, 11 and 12. Here, we generate histograms for the indegrees, outdegrees, triangle distributions of the original and the simulated graphs. The number of bins
are different in the indegree, outdegree and triangle histograms as it depends on the range
of values.
The triangle distributions are generated assuming the graph is undirected and singleedge. In order to compare the triangle distributions of the simulated graphs generated by
our simulation methodology and Preferential attachment algorithm with the original graph,
we plot a histogram chart in Figure 3.15 for scenario 7 and 12. Similar figures for scenario
5 and 11 are given in Figure 4.1 in the Appendix. In Figure 3.15, bin width for the histogram is 5 and the number of nodes (y-axis values) is presented in a logarithmic scale
to fit in the chart. From this figure, we can see that the Preferential attachment algorithm
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simulates lots of nodes with a large number of triangles which are not present in the original graph. Compare to the Preferential attachment algorithm, our simulation algorithm
simulates quite similar distribution as the original graph. But, from this histogram, it is
hard to understand how each of these simulation algorithms (Ours and Preferential) performed while simulating the nodes that are connected in triangles in the original graph. To
understand that, we need to emphasize more on the bins that have nodes in the original
graph.
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(a) Scenario 7

(b) Scenario 12

Figure 3.15: Comparison of full triangle histograms of overall graphs (original vs simulated vs preferential)

But the number of nodes involved with 0 (triangle free) and 1 triangle are much higher
compared to other nodes (more than 99%). Therefore, it is not possible to clearly visualize the values for all the bins by plotting a complete histogram in one figure. Though
it is possible to demonstrate the values for all bins in a single figure using a logarithmic
scale (similar to Figure 3.15) but, by using logarithm scale, small differences between the
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simulated and original values are lost. In this research it is important to take into account
for the small differences in number of triangles between the simulated and original graphs.
Additionally, both the Preferential attachment algorithm and our simulation methodology
produce some nodes with a large number of triangles. As a result, histograms for the
simulated graphs contain lots of extra bins compare to the original graph.
As the bin for 0 and 1 triangle dominates the overall chart and make it difficult to compare the performance of the simulation algorithms on other bins, we present Figure 3.16 to
compare the number of nodes that are not associated with any triangles and Figure 3.17 to
compare the number of nodes that are associated with a single triangle. While simulating
nodes without any triangles in Figure 3.16, the performance of our simulation algorithm
and Preferential attachment algorithm is almost similar. But when comparing performance
while simulating single triangles in Figure 3.16, we can see that the Preferential attachment
algorithm performed better than ours in sccenario 5, 7 and 12.

Figure 3.16: Comparison of number of nodes without triangle
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Figure 3.17: Comparison of number of nodes with single triangle

Now, in Figure 3.18, we only show the range of bins that are present in the original
graphs to compare how the simulation algorithms performed in simulating nodes that are
involved in bigger communities in the original graphs. We removed the 0-1 bin as we
already compared them. Figure 3.18 contains the histogram for scenario 7 and 12 only.
Similar histogram figures for scenario 5 and 11 are given in Figure 4.2 in the Appendix. In
all the scenarios, our simulation methodology performed quite better than the Preferential
attachment algorithm. One of our goal in this research is to develop a simulation methodology that can generate similar communities but not exactly the same communities. We
expect to have random variations which makes it more realistic. We can see from Figure
3.18 that our simulation algorithm successfully achieved similar distributions with some
randomness as well.
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(a) Scenario 7

(b) Scenario 12

Figure 3.18: Comparison of triangle histogram for selective bins present in original graph

To evaluate the indegrees and outdegrees of the simulated graph, we generate histograms for indegrees and outdegrees for both the original and simulated graphs. Unlike
the histograms for triangles, we visualize the values for all bins of the histograms of indegrees and outdegrees in a single figure. Figures 3.19 and 3.20 demonstrate the histograms
for indegrees and outdegrees of the nodes in the simulated and original graphs for scenario
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12. Similar results found for scenario 5, 7 and 11. As indegrees and outdegrees can vary
within a large range of values, we use a logarithm scale while plotting the number of nodes.
Bin width for these histograms is 30. From Figures 3.19 and 3.20 it is evident that our simulated graphs achieved almost similar degree distributions to the original graphs (for both
indegree and outdegree). As Preferential attachment algorithm is designed to simulate degree distributions correctly, it achieved similar distribution successfully as well. It is to be
noted that for some bins, there are no visible values. Because the values corresponding to
those bins are close to 1, which become 0 due to the application of logarithm (Figure 3.19
and 3.20).

Figure 3.19: Comparison of indegree histograms for scenario 12
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Figure 3.20: Comparison of outdegree histograms for scenario 12

3.4.4

Comparison of the Simulated Scaled-up Graph with the Original Graph

This section describes the results obtained after scaling up the simulated graph 3 times
of the original graph for scenario 12 of CTU-13 dataset. We scaled up both of the simulated
graphs; one created by our simulation algorithm and another by the Preferential attachment
algorithm. Because of our hardware limitation on the number of available processors, we
can scale-up the graph only 3 times. But by using our Enterprise connection algorithm,
graph can be scaled up linearly with the number of processors. Here, we compare the botnets subgraphs of the original and the scaled-up simulated graphs (Ours and Preferential)
using visualization approach. We also compare the histograms of the triangle, indegree,
and outdegree distributions of the original graph with the scaled-up simulated graphs.

3.4.4.1

Comparison of Botnet Subgraph

In Figure 3.21, we compare the scaled-up simulated botnet subgraph generated by our
simulation algorithm and Preferential attachment algorithm with the original botnet sub85

graph using a visualization approach. Similar to Section 3.4.2.2, we used ForceAtlas2
layout of Gephi to draw these figures. The original botnet subgraph given here is the same
as given in Figure 3.10.
In the original botnet subgraph (Figure 3.21a), there are three major clusters. In our
simulated scaled-up graph (Figure 3.21b), there are three subgraphs similar to the original
botnet subgraph and each subgraph contains three major clusters similar to the original
botnet. Also, it is quite interesting that these three botnet subgraphs are connected with
each other. In our simulation approach, we did not connect them intentionally. It happened
automatically as a result of how the enterprises got connected with each other. In Enterprise
connection algorithm, we choose N = 10, f = 1/3, and P = 3 that results E = 20. We
could have chosen one node from each subgraph but as graphs like CTU-13 contain several
nodes with high indegree and outdegree, choosing more nodes introduce more randomness
and makes the graph more realistic. These random 20 connections (E = 20) among high
degree nodes made the botnet subgraphs connected as well.
Figure 3.21c represents the botnet subgraph simulated by Preferential attachment algorithm. There is no visible similarity between the original botnet subgraph and the botnet
subgraph simulated by Preferential attachment algorithm. Also, from the figure, we can
see that three botnets subgraphs simulated by each of the processors are not connected to
each other (we had to apply Gravity property of Gephi to draw them in close proximity).
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(a) Original botnet

(b) Botnet by our simulation algorithm

(c) Botnet by preferential

Figure 3.21: Comparison of the scaled-up botnets from scenario 12
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3.4.4.2

Comparison of Overall Graph

Figure 3.22 shows the comparison of the triangle distribution of the original graph, 3x
scaled-up graph simulated by our simulation algorithm and 3x scaled-up graph simulated
by the Preferential attachment algorithm. From the figure, we can see that Preferential
attachment algorithm generates lots of extra triangles compare to our simulation methodology. To evaluate how our simulation methodology performed after scaling-up, we plot a
separate histogram in Figure 3.23 to compare our simulated graph with the original graph.

Figure 3.22: Comparison of triangle histogram of scaled-up graph of scenario 12 (original
vs simulated vs preferential)
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Figure 3.23: Comparison of triangle histogram between the original and the simulated
scaled-up graph

As we mentioned before in Section 3.4.3.2 that the number of nodes involved with no
and single triangles dominates the histogram, in Figure 3.23 we show the histogram values
for all the nodes involved in more than 1 triangles. In Figure 3.23, we see that there are
some deviations as well as similarities of the simulated scaled-up graph with the original
graph. As the simulated graph is scaled-up to 3 times the original graph, the number of
nodes involved with triangles in the simulated graph should also increase approximately 3
times. For the first bin, the number of nodes connected with 2-3 triangles in the simulated
graph seems to be 4 times rather than 3 times the number of nodes in the original graph.
But for the rest of the bins (4-5, 6-7, 8-9 and more), there is a similar pattern in the histogram and the values are approximately 3 times larger. Besides simulating similar triangle
distribution as the original, our simulation algorithm also generates some nodes associated
with a large number of triangles. Thus, we can say that scaling-up our simulated graph
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using Enterprise connection algorithm preserves the pattern in triangle distribution with
little variation.
As we already know from the literature and seen in Section 3.4.3.2 that Preferential attachment algorithm can simulate same degree distribution as the original graph, it is unnecessary to show any comparison of its performance while simulating degree distributions.
Figure 3.24 demonstrates the histogram of indegree and Figure 3.25 demonstrates the histogram of outdegree of the original and the scaled-up graph simulated by our methodology.
In both graphs, the number of nodes is represented using a logarithmic scale. For both indegree and outdegree, the simulated large graph has almost the same pattern in the histogram
as the original graph, only the number of nodes are scaled up to 3 times. There are small
deviations in the simulated scaled-up graph from the original graph in few instances, for
example, in Figure 3.24, there is one node at the very last bin that is deviated from the
original graph.
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Figure 3.24: Comparison of indegree histogram between the original and the simulated
scaled-up graph

Figure 3.25: Comparison of outdegree between the original and the simulated scaled-up
graph

The Preferential attachment algorithm performs well in simulating degree (indegree
and outdegree) distributions. But in simulating the triangle distributions, our simulation
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algorithm outperformed the Preferential attachment algorithm. Also, in terms of simulating
the botnet subgraph, our simulation algorithm performed much better than the Preferential
attachment algorithm.

3.5

Conclusion and Future Work
In this research, we develop a graph simulation methodology to simulate botnet dataset

based on the Markov chain and role-mining approach. As one of our main goals is to simulate botnet behavior inside a normal netflow dataset, we emphasize more on the botnet
subgraph. This methodology simulates the indegrees, outdegrees and triangles for each
node while hiding the original node identities. Also, we develop Enterprise connection
algorithm that scales-up the simulated graph linearly with the number of processors. We
compared our simulated graphs with graphs simulated by the Preferential attachment algorithm and with the given graph (original dataset). Our numerical experiments show
promising results as the simulated overall graph as well as the simulated botnet traffic is
very similar to the original dataset with a small variation. Based on the comparison of histograms, our methodology generates a simulated graph that is almost similar to the original
(given) graph. Besides having a better histogram similarity, a similar pattern with small
natural randomness is also clearly visible between the simulated and the original botnet
subgraph in the visualization of botnet traffic. Also, we see that our simulated scaled-up
graph preserves a similar pattern as the original graph based on the number of triangles,
indegrees, outdegrees, and botnets.
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We find that the simulation of triangles is more challenging and complex process compared to the simulation of indegrees and outdegrees. But, from the experimental results,
we see that our proposed methodology performed really well in simulating the number
of triangles. This research can be further extended by improving some limitations of the
simulation methodology. We observe that while adding remaining edges in Section 3.3.6,
we are adding edges without considering their effect on the existing triangles. As a consequence, the simulation methodology creates undesired triangles in the simulated graph.
An extension of this research would be to modify the methodology to avoid the creation of
these undesired triangles.
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation studies a network security problem related to bots and botnets in a
large labeled netflow dataset. We can summarize our effort in two major topics as follows:
(1) develop a generic bot detection methodology and evaluate it on a real-life botnet dataset
and (2) develop a simulation methodology that can simulate a large-scale botnet dataset
from a given real-life botnet dataset with similar distributions of triangles, indegrees and
outdegrees and botnet characteristics and evaluate its performance.

4.1

Bot Detection for Real-life Highly Class-Imbalanced Dataset
Chapter II describes our research on the first topic. In this research, we develop a

generic bot detection methodology based on supervised learning that can detect varieties of
bots from a real-life, large, and highly imbalanced network dataset. To develop the generic
bot detection method, we propose three novel generic IP-based features and use them to
build classification models for botnet detection. We evaluate our methodology on a reallife dataset known as CTU-13 Netflow dataset. It is a real-life labeled netflow dataset that
contains botnet, normal and background traffic. This dataset is highly class-imbalanced
where the percentage of bot is only 0.00583% of the total nodes. But, the experimental
results show that our proposed bot detection methodology classifies different types of bots
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with 99.66% accuracy, which is higher than the previous works in the relevant literature.
We also compare our methodology with the methods of Garcia et al. [4] that shows the
better performance of our method in bot detection for real-life highly class-imbalanced
dataset.
Our first research introduces us with another limitation in the botnet research which
is the scarcity of real-life, large-scale botnet dataset. While validating our bot detection
methodology in highly class-imbalanced real-life labeled botnet dataset, we could not find
any other dataset besides CTU-13 Netflow dataset. Therefore, more research need to be
conducted to develop a simulation methodology that can simulate a real-life, large-scale
graph with similar botnet attribute and distribution of triangles, indegrees and outdegrees
of a given real-life botnet dataset.

4.2

Simulation of Large-Scale Botnet Dataset
To solve the limitation mentioned above, in Chapter III we develop a graph simulation

methodology that can simulate a large-scale botnet dataset from a given real-life botnet
dataset with a similar distribution of triangles, degrees and botnet characteristics. This
simulation methodology takes in a real-life labeled botnet dataset as input and simulates
a large-scale labeled botnet dataset based on Markov chain and role-mining. We calculate four features (indegree, outdegree, triangles and list of neighbours) for each node in
the given graph and then calculate the roles based on a simple clustering algorithm. Role
mining is an optional step in our methodology as we execute this step only if the roleinformation is not given by the user. We also calculate a few other necessary properties
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(e.g. Transition probability matrix, ARND) for the Markov chain and simulation process.
Using all this information we simulate a botnet dataset with similar size of the given botnet dataset. In our simulation process, we emphasize more on the accuracy of the botnet
subgraph and triangles as it is quite challenging to simulate them correctly. Our simulation
method also has an independent scaling-up algorithm, namely Enterprise connection algorithm. Enterprise connection algorithm is linearly scalable with the number of processors
in use. Therefore, our simulation methodology is suitable for a distributed system as well.
CTU-13 Netflow dataset is used to evaluate our simulation methodology.
Botnet subgraph in simulated graph is compared with the original botnet subgraph,
before and after the scaling-up. In both cases, the botnet is our simulated graph looks
quite similar to the given botnet. We also compare the distribution of triangles, indegrees
and outdegrees of the overall simulated graph with the given graph, before and after the
scaling-up. The experimental results show that our simulated scaled-up (or similar size)
graph has a similar distribution of triangles, indegrees and outdegrees of the original graph
with a bit of natural random deviations. Moreover, a comparison using the visualization
approach established strong similarity of our simulated botnet subgraph with the original
botnet subgraph.
Because of the hardware limitation, our simulated scaled-up dataset has approximately
300K nodes. But, using our simulation methodology and 1000 - 2000 processors a simulated botnet dataset can be generated with more than 1 billions of nodes and 10 billions of
edges. If we can generate such large-scale simulated botnet dataset which is also similar
to a real-life botnet dataset, it will help the research in network security, graph algorithms,
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HPC to evaluate the scalability and performance of many existing as well as new algorithms.

4.3

Limitations and Future Work
There are some limitations of the generic bot detection research that provides the scope

of some possible future research. Our proposed methodology is designed to detect the bots
after the attack stage. Our methodology may also fail to detect a bot that is not successful
in the attack stage. One possible extension of this research is to develop a methodology to
detect bots before the attack stage. Another extension could be to apply our methodology
into other datasets to evaluate the performance of our proposed features and methodology
in bot and botnet detection.
Our research on simulating a large-scale botnet dataset in Chapter III has a limitation
while simulating triangles. In our simulation process, when we are adding edges in the step
3.3.6, we are creating some unintentional triangles. To prevent our simulation method from
the creation of these unintentional triangles will be something quite challenging. Solving
this limitation can be considered as a possible extension of this work. Another possible
extension can be to evaluate the performance of our methodology on a dense graph.
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APPENDIX A
SIMULATION OF LARGE-SCALE BOTNET DATASET
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A.1 Comparison of Histograms

(a) Scenario 5

(b) Scenario 11

Figure A.1: Comparison of full triangle histograms (original vs simulated vs
preferential)
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(a) Scenario 5

(b) Scenario 11

Figure A.2: Comparison of triangle histogram for selective bins present in original
graph
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